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Abstract 
The goal of this Interactive Qualifying Project was to evaluate the Massachusetts health 
care reform of 2006 to determine its impact, if any, on the hospital level. Through background 
research of reforms in Canada and Taiwan, it was discovered that hospital efficiency is an aspect 
that may be influenced by health reform. The relative efficiency scores of 65 hospitals were 
calculated through the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Significant positive change in 
efficiency was observed through Window Analysis, supporting the hypothesis. Through the use 
of multiple regression however, the hypothesis was disproved. Instead, the results suggested that 
the occupancy rate of hospitals was a significant factor.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 On April 1
st
, 2006 the state of Massachusetts underwent a monumental health care reform 
with the legislation formally known as Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006. The reform overhaul was 
the first successful implementation of near universal healthcare in the United States, and has 
since been looked at and evaluated by other states and nations for guidance, most notably the 
United States and its national reform in 2010. The goal of the reform was to “provide access to 
affordable, quality, and accountable healthcare” (An Act Providing Access to Affordable, 
Quality, and Accountable Health Care, 2006). It achieved its goal through a variety of means, 
those of which include an individual mandate for health insurance, a marketplace of quality 
health care providers, expansions to previous state aid plans, and further legislation regarding 
employer-based insurance.  
 The expansions in health coverage raise the question of whether or not the reform had an 
impact at the hospital level, specifically hospital performance. In this paper our goal is to 
evaluate whether or not the reform in 2006 has had an effect on short term acute care hospitals in 
Massachusetts by determining the change in hospital efficiency from 2004 through 2008 using 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is a non-parametric form of analysis commonly used 
among researchers and management alike to determine the relative efficiency of decision making 
units (e.g., bank branches, hospitals, and other firms). DEA is preferred by some researchers 
because of its ability to create a more comprehensive efficiency rating by taking multiple factors 
into consideration. The factors taken into consideration are grouped as inputs and outputs. 
Efficiency, defined as “a ratio of output to input” (Sherman and Zhu, 2006, p.51), can be 
increased by minimizing input while maximizing output. 
 
 
9  
 
 Previous studies conducted on hospital efficiency in Canada and Taiwan have provided 
insight on the use of DEA to evaluate hospital performance.  As a precursor to our analysis, we 
look towards work done in these countries as examples of how a reform can affect hospital 
performance and how efficiency can be evaluated. While conducting research on the changes in 
hospital performance due to the 1995 health care reform in Taiwan, researchers found an 
increase in hospital efficiency preceding the reform and a decrease in efficiency post reform. 
Researchers also observed an overall increase in both input and output in anticipation of the 
reform. The researchers’ goal in Canada was to analyze the technical efficiency of community 
hospitals in Ontario, Canada, and to determine whether or not ownership, size, or location had a 
significant effect on hospital efficiency. Through the use of DEA and test statistics, researchers 
found no significant change in performance of hospitals. We hypothesized that because the 
individual mandate on health insurance in Massachusetts increased the mean coverage rate by 
five percent (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010) and increased patient volume in hospitals, the change in 
hospital usage will have a slight positive impact on hospital efficiency. Through the use of DEA 
and two specific methods to measure efficiency over the period of reform, our findings were 
somewhat inconclusive. However, the results of one particular test suggest that relative 
efficiency increased after the implementation of the reform. Through the use of regression on the 
efficiency scores from this particular test, no significant correlation was found between the 
reform and the change in efficiency noted. Instead, the results suggest that the occupancy rate of 
hospitals held a significant positive role in the change. Our original hypothesis was disproved, as 
there was no direct link between the reform and hospital efficiency, but the significance of 
occupancy rate during the reform period could have occurred due to the reform, thus being an 
indirect effect due to the health reform. 
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2.0 Massachusetts Background 
2.1 Leading up to the Reform 
 At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the state of Massachusetts was already accustomed to 
success with regards to medical health care. Prior to the reform, the average coverage rate of its 
residents was 89.5%, and was higher than the national average coverage rate of 82.7%; at the 
time, Massachusetts was the 7
th
 leading state in health insurance coverage (Kolstad & Kowalski, 
2010). The state hosted a multitude of public and private programs including MassHealth, a 
subsidized range of plans whose goal was to aid both the elderly and the financially needy have 
access to adequate healthcare. Those without access to health insurance still held the right to 
utilize some hospital services without compensation. In order to compensate hospitals for unpaid 
medical bills, the state government amassed a fund of approximately 700 million dollars known 
as the Uncompensated Care Pool or UCP in 1985. The fund functioned as a safety net until the 
1990s, where the remaining funds formed a free care program to serve as health insurance for 
those who could not afford it. Coverage under the free care program would range from 200% to 
400% of the federal poverty line. The federal bill known as Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA) was passed soon after in 1986. The national law was a 
mandate for hospitals to provide a medical screening examination in order to determine whether 
or not a patient has a medical condition. If so, the hospital is obligated to stabilize the patient 
without pay before discharging or transferring the patient to another hospital. Concern was that 
the uninsured in the state would begin to crowd emergency services and utilize them as a source 
of primary care instead of seeing a physician for preventable conditions. In a study conducted in 
2003 by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy (DHCFP), researchers 
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sought to describe the population utilizing hospital emergency services, the results of which are 
shown below.  
Table 1: Hospital Frequency Usage by Insurance Status (2006) 
 
(Fuda & Immekus, 2006) 
 The state found that 44% of all infrequent visitors to the emergency department (ED) 
from October 1, 2002 to September 30, 2003 were uninsured patients seeking treatment. Also, 
the study found that of the total population in Massachusetts, 1% were frequent users of the ED, 
with five visits to the ED during the aforementioned timeframe qualifying a patient as a frequent 
user. Of this subset, 15% of frequent users were currently uninsured in the state (Fuda & 
Immekus, 2006). With an increasing number of both uninsured patients and Medicaid patients 
putting pressure on hospitals providing uncompensated or subsidized care, the concern arose that 
taxes would have to increase to support hospital compensation, causing the debate that led to the 
reform (Holahan & Blumberg, 2009). 
2.2 Reform Specifications 
 The reform, formally known as Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006, introduced a variety of 
amendments onto pre-existing programs as well as created new programs to aid in the 
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accessibility of health care. The most prominent feature of the legislation was a mandate that 
required each individual to obtain healthcare. In order to enforce this mandate, a fee is incurred 
by means of a tax penalty on those who opt out of having health insurance, with the exception of 
those who are too poor or have a religious objection. The amount incurred for penalties has been 
amended multiple times to increase the fee and can currently be determined with the following 
table.  
Table 2: Penalty Chart (2010)  
 
(Assessment of Penalties, Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2010) 
 Massachusetts also expanded its Insurance Partnership Program, which provides 
subsidies and incentives for employers to provide and for employees to enroll in employer-
sponsored insurance. Under the program, the state government would subsidize insurance costs 
for employees who would be able to attain government subsidized insurance (due to income 
level) but are on employer-sponsored insurance instead (Doonan & Tull 2010). The bill also 
included a mandate for employers to provide health insurance if the number of full-time 
employees exceeds eleven. Employers who do not meet this requirement are charged a fee of 295 
dollars per employee. In order to avoid this penalty, employers must provide at least 33% of their 
employees’ health insurance premiums and have 25% of their employees enrolled under an 
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employer-sponsored program (McDonough, Rosman, Butt, Tucker, & Howe, 2008). The bill 
also expanded on previous programs such as MassHealth by decreasing requirements necessary 
to qualify for coverage. The initial expansion included an increase from 200% to 300% of the 
federal poverty line for children. Previous benefits cut from the 2002-03 recession were 
reinstated, including dentures, eyeglasses, and dental care (McDonough et al., 2008). The 
remainder of the UCP fund was used to conceive a new program called CommCare, which 
offered partially subsidized and fully subsidized care depending on eligibility. Initially, it 
provided full care for residents that did not qualify for MassHealth and earned up to 150% of the 
poverty line. It also offered partial care for those who earned up to 300% of the poverty line. The 
legislation also called for the creation of a new program called the Connector; a health insurance 
marketplace aiming to make healthcare more accessible in Massachusetts. Individuals who do 
not qualify for subsidized health care can use the Connector to purchase health insurance from a 
multitude of private insurers and other forms of unsubsidized care. Below is a timeline 
illustrating the various amendments and implementation dates of the reform since its beginning 
in 2006.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Health Care Reform Timeline 
Date Amendment/Implementation 
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April 12, 2006 Health reform signed into law 
July 1, 2006 
 
MassHealth eligibility, benefit expansions and enrollment cap 
increases implemented 
October 30, 2006 CommCare for <100% and employer fair share contribution 
implemented 
January 1, 2007 CommCare for 101-300% implemented, family policies support 
up to 25 years, and insurance rating changes, “case 
characteristics” eliminated (excluding tobacco) 
Open enrollment for non-subsidized plans through Connector 
with coverage effective 
July 1, 2007 Open enrollment begins for Commonwealth Choice 
May 1, 2007 Employers with 11 or more full-time-equivalent Massachusetts 
employees must make a “fair and reasonable” 
contribution toward an employee health plan or pay a 
state assessment of $295 per employee, per year 
December 1, 2007 Connector publishes premium schedule of the lowest premium 
on the market for which an individual would be eligible for 
“creditable coverage” under the individual mandate 
January 1, 2008 Individual mandate penalty raised to 50% of minimum premium 
January 1, 2009 Health insurance benefits an adult must carry to avoid penalties 
now include prescription drug coverage, preventative and 
primary care, with no annual limit on treatment for any sickness 
Sources:  Health Care Reform: Timeline and Health Care Reform Implementation Timeline 
2.3 After effects 
 Since its implementation, the effects of the reform have been analyzed; shedding light on 
the impact it had on multiple levels. Most research has been devoted into looking at the impact 
on the individual level, changes in coverage rates, and cost analysis. For example, coverage 
expansion and an individual mandate led Massachusetts to define affordability standards, 
establish a minimum level of insurance coverage, adopt insurance market reforms, and add both 
institute incentives and penalties to encourage coverage (Doonan & Tull 2010). Data obtained 
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from 2008 shows that the uninsured rate of the non-elderly decreased to 7% from its original 
uninsured rate of 14% (Steinbrook, 2008). It also cut the number of uninsured working adults in 
half (i.e., from 14% to 7%) (Long, Cook, & Stokley 2008). As of May 2008, the amount of 
newly insured equaled 350,000, and approximately 409,000 were considered newly insured by 
2009. In addition, 44% of the coverage expansion was due to the new Commonwealth Care 
while 24% was due to the new Medicaid expansions (Steinbrook, 2008). 
 There are issues despite the reform’s overall success. There is still a portion of the 
population that remains uninsured today. Cost due to the reform is increasing, and the challenges 
of sustaining the subsidized program have been exacerbated by the recent economic downturn. In 
addition, the results from a series of interviews conducted in 2007 show that those with lower 
incomes found it more difficult to arrange appointments or find a doctor that would see them 
(Long, 2008). Despite its success post-reform, spending for CommCare was $132.9 million and 
was estimated to increase to $674.4 million in fiscal year 2008. Overall, the per-capita cost of 
medical care in Massachusetts is high compared to the national average (Steinbrook, 2008). As 
with any other health reform, there is always a reason that drives people to want change in health 
care. In Massachusetts it was the concept of near universal coverage and issues dealing with 
hospital compensation. These goals may have had an impact on hospital efficiency, but to be 
certain the reforms of  Canada and Taiwan were evaluated to see if they were under similar 
conditions pre and post reform, and also to evaluate what affect their reforms  had on hospital 
efficiency.  
  
 
 
16  
 
3.0 Taiwan Background 
3.1 Economy as fuel for Reform 
The health care reform law implemented in Taiwan on March 1
st
, 1995 is a marking point 
in the history of the country’s development. Taiwan has been regarded as an “economic miracle” 
by many, as it experienced an economic boom for much of the last quarter of the 20
th
 century and 
is still growing today. This is due, in part, to the industrialization of the island in conjunction 
with its already strong agriculture. Taiwan is one of the few areas in the East that have developed 
to the extent of western countries.  After World War II, Taiwan had no industrial base, spiraling 
inflation and an increase in population. Taiwan’s government was forced into action by investing 
money into local industrialization (Vogel, 1991). In 1952, 18% of all goods and services 
originating in Taiwan came from manufacturing whereas 35% came from agriculture.  After 
industrializing, the country’s GNP increased annually by 10% on average from 1961 to 1981. In 
1982, 8.7% of all goods and services originating in Taiwan came from agriculture while 43.9% 
came from industry, all while the unemployment rate rarely passed 2% (Chai, 1986). This rapid 
growth in Taiwan’s economy is what led the people to demand health care of the government. 
Prior to the reform, Taiwan’s government kept a laissez-faire approach to the medical industry, 
except in the event of a disease outbreak or an epidemic that threatened social stability. The 
medical profession remained independent from the government, allowing private companies to 
drive and control the health industry (Chung-tung, 1998). The following table shows the basic 
and health indicators in Taiwan from select years between 1960 and 1994. 
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Table 5: Taiwan Pre-reform Health Indicators (Chiang, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the table, the number of hospital beds has been decreasing since the 1960’s, 
but it also shows a decrease in public beds in Taiwan. In 1994, the percentage of public hospital 
beds was only 39.9%. There was also a lack of general practitioners and primary care physicians 
in Taiwan, making care even harder to find. In 1994, there were only 1.1 practitioners per every 
1000 citizens. Prior to the health reform in 1995, there were a total of 13 health care plans in 
Taiwan, three of which are of the greatest importance. These three plans, the Government 
Employee Insurance (GEI), the Labor Insurance (LI), and the Farmer’s Health Insurance (FHI) 
were established in 1948, 1959, and 1989 respectively. They were operated by the Central Trust 
of China and the Bureau of Labor Insurance located in Taiwan. These health systems were 
complex, and they also had different premium rates, premium collection policies, benefits for the 
insured, and payment standards. The percentages covered by the three plans GEI, LI, and FHI 
were 8.2%, 37%, and 8.2%, respectively. The remaining 47% of the population was composed of 
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mainly children, the elderly, and housewives (Chou, 2003). Since the only method of obtaining 
insurance was through employment and the only program that offered insurance to children and 
elderly was the GEI, over half of the population was uninsured (Chou, 2003).Those who were 
uninsured were deterred from seeking necessary medical services, and this created unequal 
access to healthcare between socioeconomic classes (Hung, 2008).  By 1980, both the LI and the 
GEI only covered 16% of the population (Chiang, 1997). In addition, they failed to cover 
children under the age of 14 as well as adults over the age of 65 (Hung, 2008). In total, the 
insurance plans only covered about 60% of the total population in Taiwan. Coverage was 14%, 
77%, and 57% for those aged under 20, 20-64, and 65 years and over respectively (Lee, 2010). 
Many of the insurance plans offered in Taiwan ran under deficit for years, and this fueled the 
need for reform as members of the government and the public wanted to overcome the financial 
deficits of the current insurance systems and disproportion of public access to adequate 
healthcare (Hung, 2008). 
3.2 Reform Specifications 
To care for the health of its people, the Taiwanese government set up a planning 
committee under the Council for Economic Planning and Development in 1988 to develop a new 
healthcare plan. The process of conceiving the National Health Insurance bill took a total of five 
years to develop, from 1989 to 1995 (Chang, 1998). During this time Taiwan studied the health 
insurance plans of developed worlds. They began to create a system similar to the Medicaid 
system already formed in the United States. The NHI’s main goal was to create a universal 
health care plan that forced all to participate, where citizens would get the same uniform 
comprehensive benefits, and would be partially financed by payroll tax and government 
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subsidies. Its main concern was to provide coverage for the non-working population whom 
otherwise would have no access to health care (i.e. children, elderly, non-working adults). It 
required that all participate regardless of family status, income, or location. The comprehensive 
benefits included ambulatory care, primary physician care, dental care, home care, emergency 
care, inpatient care, prescription drugs, laboratory tests, and mental illness treatment. The NHI is 
financed primarily by income-related premiums (payroll), with employees, employers, and the 
government all paying a share of the premiums (Lee, 2010).  In general, the amount of premiums 
covered by employees was based not on their income alone, but also the source of the income 
itself. The coverage rates are explained in the following table. 
Table 6: Taiwan Subsidy Rates 
Type of Job 
Covered by 
Government 
Covered by 
Employer 
Covered by 
Insured 
Public employees 10% 50% (Government) 40% 
Private 
employees 
10% 60% 30% 
Farmers and 
veterans 
70% - 30% 
Low income 
families and 
military 
personnel 
100% - - 
High income self-
employed 
- - 100% 
Other 
unemployed 
40% - 60% 
 
(Wen et al., 2008) 
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3.3 After effects 
 The national health insurance implemented in Taiwan on March 1
st
, 1995 sought 
to improve the overall quality, access, and cost of health insurance to the people of Taiwan. “The 
Taiwanese have more equal access to health care, greater financial risk protection, and equity in 
health care financing” (Lu & Hsiao, 2003, para.1). A step Taiwan took towards improving the 
overall benefits of the national health insurance was to include an extremely comprehensive list 
of health services now provided to anyone insured under the national health insurance. Those 
covered receive a number of prescription drugs, preventative care, in home care services, 
Chinese medicine, annual checkups, maternal care and even dental services (Lu & Hsiao, 2003). 
With the benefit of these services, Taiwanese citizens were also allowed to choose their own 
hospitals and doctors to receive those services. These benefits did not only affect patients in a 
positive manner, but physicians as well. Physicians could choose to continue to charge a fee for 
service if they wished and also were allowed to continue to practice western or Chinese medicine 
in the manner of their choosing. Recipients of any care do have to pay a copayment of about five 
American dollars. The only people exempt from this fee are those citizens who come from a poor 
household. 
Although the national health insurance sought to cover all of Taiwan’s citizens, as 
expected, not everyone was covered. “With astounding speed, 92 percent of the population had 
enrolled in the NHI by the end of 1995, and 96 percent had enrolled by the end of 1996. By the 
end of 2001, 97 percent of the total eligible population had enrolled. The three percent not 
enrolled may be living overseas or in very remote areas, and perhaps includes the near poor with 
irregular income sources or independent minded wealthy self-employed people” (Lu & Hsiao, 
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2003, para. 11). Because of the geological terrain and percentage of poor people living in 
mountainous area, health care access could not be easily obtained by all. “1.64 percent of its 
[Taiwan’s] population lives on remote islands and in mountainous areas” (Lu & Hsiao, 2003, 
para. 15).   The majority of citizens living in remote islands is very poor and cannot afford health 
care and simply cannot access it. “59 percent of residents in mountainous areas reported having 
more than thirty minutes of travel time (one way) to their primary doctor” (Lu & Hsiao, 2003, 
para. 15).   The previous quote illustrates the poor distribution of health care resources 
throughout Taiwan. Taiwan’s government acknowledged this issue as a serious problem. The 
goal of the reform was to provide equal access to all citizens of Taiwan, rich or poor, so they 
sought to solve this issue. In order to provide health care to those living in poor regions the 
Bureau of National Health Insurance encouraged doctors to make weekly, bi-weekly, or even 
monthly trips out to these remote areas to provide health services to those in need, who would 
otherwise not be able to receive services. Doctors did so with the promise of incentives.  
Although the goal of the National Health Insurance in Taiwan was to provide equal 
access of health care to all its citizens, this was not immediately accomplished. The government 
recognized that there were still some who were not able to afford or access the necessary health 
care. With their recognition of the problem, the Taiwanese government alleviated the situation so 
that the National Health Insurance may cover as many as possible. 
3.4 Comparison to Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
 Comparing the country of Taiwan to the state of Massachusetts is difficult due to the 
number of differences that exist between them. On the other hand, both health reforms had 
similar goals and outcomes. The NHI was the Taiwanese government’s attempt to play a larger 
 
 
22  
 
role in the health care industry by providing equal access to coverage for all citizens in the 
country. The health care reform in Massachusetts sought to provide affordable and quality health 
care. Prior to the reform, the initial coverage rates were significantly higher in Massachusetts 
compared to Taiwan, with a difference of 29.5%. In Taiwan, the majority of the uninsured 
consisted of children, elderly, and non-working adults due to healthcare being limited only to 
those who were employed at the time. Essentially, Taiwan was lacking the equivalent of 
Massachusetts Medicaid to provide health care to poor families. The NHI established a single 
payer system in Taiwan funded through taxes and supplemented with government subsidies, 
while Massachusetts operates under a free market, where individuals choose and pay for 
insurance. The number of uninsured decreased 36% and 7% in Taiwan and Massachusetts after 
two years following implementation, respectively.  
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4.0 Canada Background 
4.1 Motivation for Reform 
 With the many economic changes that occurred throughout Canada just a few years prior 
to the implementation of the Canada Health Act, there was a real necessity for health care 
reform. Prior to the reform, in 1978 the wage and price controls policy were ended by the 
government. Wage and price controls are regulations implemented by a government to control 
the incomes of labor and capital in response to inflation. At times these regulations also indicate 
the need to distribute the wealth of the country between its citizens. In response to the removal of 
the wage and price controls as well as the country’s inflation and recession, doctors and nurses 
began to negotiate with the provincial governments to compensate for their lost income. Doctors 
would begin to charge additional fees that were tacked onto certain care services and some where 
even charging an extra fee each day a patient stayed in a hospital. In addition, 32 strikes were 
held by the nurse’s union, demanding improvement to working conditions and higher pay. 
During this time, Canada had previously established that health care was a right for all citizens 
so they were forced to find a way to alleviate this crisis. These pressures lead to the 
implementation of the Canada Health Act of 1984 (Making Medicare: The History of Health 
Care in Canada 1914-2007, 2010). 
4.2 Canada Health Act of 1984 
  Canadian health care has been in the works since the early 1900s. For years 
Canada struggled with developing a strong health care system that would benefit citizens and 
their government alike. After many years of change and discussion the official reform came 
about in 1984. The reform passed in 1984 by the House of Commons is officially called the 
Canada Health Act, but is more commonly known as Medicare. The Canada Health Act is a 
 
 
24  
 
publicly funded health care system that covers all persons under the basis of legal status in 
Canada, permanent residents included. Policy makers in Canada desired to “protect, promote, 
and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable 
access to health services without financial or other barriers” (Canada Health Act: Annual Report 
2007-2008, p.3). The Canada Health Act is a single payer system meaning that the care provided 
is comprehensive and universal. The system is funded through tax money. When deciding how to 
meet the financial demands of such a large health care system, the authors established the 
Canada Health Transfer. All participants must be within the criteria and conditions of the Canada 
Health Act established in order to receive full government funding. The goal of the Canada 
Health Act is to provide medical services to those in need on a prepaid basis without the need for 
any fee at the time of service. 
4.3 Reform Specifications 
  Because a single payer system defines that recipients receive universal and 
comprehensive health care, writers of the Canada Health Act established certain definitions for 
all participants to be certain of their entitlements if covered under Medicare. There are six 
definitions clearly laid out. The definitions are as follows: 
1. Insured Persons: “Eligible residents of a province or territory are people lawfully 
entitled to be or to remain in Canada who makes his home and is ordinarily present in 
the province, but does not include a tourist, a transient or a visitor to the province” 
(Canada Health Act: Annual Report 2007-2008, p.3). 
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2. Insured Health Services: “Medically necessary hospital, physician, and surgical-
dental services provided to insured persons” (Canada Health Act: Annual Report 
2007-2008, p.3). 
3. Insured Hospital Services: “Medically necessary in and out patient service such as 
accommodation and meals, nursing service, laboratory, radiological, diagnostic 
procedures with necessary interpretations, drugs, use of operating room, case room, 
anesthetic facilities, radiotherapy facilities, and physiotherapy facilities” (Canada 
Health Act: Annual Report 2007-2008, p.3). 
4. Insured Physician Services: “Medically required service rendered by medical 
practitioners” (Canada Health Act: Annual Report 2007-2008, p.3). 
5. Insured Surgical-Dental Services: “Services provided by a dentist in a hospital, 
where a hospital setting is required to properly perform the procedure” (Canada 
Health Act: Annual Report 2007-2008, p.3). 
6. Extended Health Care Services: “Certain aspects of long-term residential care 
(nursing home intermediate and adult residential care services) and the health aspects 
of home care and ambulatory care services” (Canada Health Act: Annual Report 
2007-2008, p.4). 
 Further conditions of the Canada Health Act are spelled out to define “accountability and 
citizen engagement” (The Canada Health Act: Fact Sheet, 2000, p.1). Conditions defined are, 
comprehensive, universality, portability, and accessibility. The insurance must be accessible to 
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those in need of services free of any charge. The act is comprehensive meaning the publicly 
funded health care must include “all medically necessary services for the purpose of maintain 
health, preventing disease, or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness, or disability” (The Canada 
Health Act: Fact Sheet, 2000, p.1). Universality refers to the requirement that the Canada Health 
Act service all legal residents of Canada and those residents do not have to pay any health care 
premiums in order to receive care. Portability refers to the necessity to cover all permanent 
residents and citizens “by a provincial insurance plan during short absences from that province” 
(The Canada Health Act: Fact Sheet, 2000, p.1). Since the Canada Health Act was implemented 
in 1984, one hundred percent of all its citizens are covered by Medicare.  
4.4 After effects 
 Prior to the Canada Health Act of 1984, the coverage rate across all provinces in Canada 
was 100%. Because the Canada Health Act of 1984 outlined all citizens’ entitlements to health 
care more clearly, rather than include restrictions that would lower the coverage rate, 100% of 
the country remained covered.  
4.5 Comparison to Massachusetts’ Health Care Reform 
  Despite differences between the Canada Health Act of 1984 and the Massachusetts 
health reform of 2006, they share certain characteristics. At the heart of both reforms is the idea 
of universality. Both Canada and Massachusetts’ reforms set out the goal to have everyone 
continue to be covered as well as begin to be covered under some sort of health insurance plan. 
While this is true, Canada’s goal was to create a system under which all citizens would be 
covered and receive a comprehensive list of free medical service funded through tax payers 
while Massachusetts’ goal was slightly different. As it is now in Massachusetts, all permanent 
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residents are required to have some form of health insurance, but Massachusetts does not dictate 
where or from whom a person is buying insurance. This point brings up another significant 
difference. Canada’s reform gave free health care to all its citizens while Massachusetts 
mandates that all residents buy some form of insurance or are covered by Medicare or Medicaid. 
Canada’s reform in comparison to Massachusetts’ reform portrays health care as more of a right 
while Massachusetts’ reform portrays it as a requirement.  
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5.0 Literature Review 
5.1 Introduction 
 A review of relevant literature is necessary in preparation for our own evaluation of the 
relationship between hospital efficiency and health care reform. This review serves as both one 
that establishes what subjects have already been researched with the methods used in prior 
literature as well as a starting point for our research. To model our own analysis we look towards 
research conducted in Canada and Taiwan due to the fact that their present reforms have been in 
existence for more than fifteen years, making it is easier to gain a clear understanding of how the 
reforms affect both hospitals and the countries’ population. Papers published from Taiwan and 
Canada have shown the impact of reform at the hospital level and its effect on hospital 
efficiency. These papers provide motivation for similar research in Massachusetts due to its 
recent reform in 2006, as an evaluation of the reform’s impact on the hospital level could reveal 
a change in hospital efficiency.   
5.2 Determinants of Hospital Performance 
 When evaluating hospitals by means of an analysis, it is important to enumerate a list of 
possible factors or determinants that may have an influence on the aspect being studied, whether 
evaluating changes in hospital efficiency, utilization, or cost. From this list, a limited amount of 
determinants are drawn and then tested using a method with the knowledge that these factors are 
considered to be the most important. Across the three reforms, we have enumerated a list of 
determinants used in papers that may have an impact on what we choose to use in our analysis.   
 Quantitative analyses of hospital utilization under universal systems include evaluations 
of its different aspects, including papers illustrating changes in utilization due to health reform 
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and others establishing determinants of utilization. The authors Pran, Broyles, and Angus (1987) 
researched the determinants of hospital utilization in Canada. They looked at the individual level 
to derive data useful to the hospital level analysis. The authors compared socio-demographic 
factors, economic factors, and importance of medical need to determine the use of hospitals in 
Canada (Manga, Broyles, & Angus, 1987). In Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), the authors’ goal 
was to evaluate changes in hospital utilization and coverage rates due to the Massachusetts 
reform in 2006 by utilizing multiple regressions. To determine the change in coverage rates they 
compared coverage rates in Massachusetts before, during, and after reform to each other as well 
as to a nationwide average. In order to evaluate changes in types of coverage they chose to 
compare the number of uninsured to those with coverage (private, Medicare, Medicaid, 
CommCare, and other programs). 
 The most prominent method used to evaluate hospital efficiency is data envelopment 
analysis, also known as DEA. This method uses a list of inputs and outputs assumed to affect the 
efficiency in a number of firms in order to calculate an efficiency score for each unit. A review 
of literature on the use of DEA including Cooper et al. (2004) has shown that the majority of 
hospital efficiency papers use similar determinants, regardless which aspect of efficiency is 
focused on. This is done purposely in order to facilitate the comparison of publications; DEA 
would lose credibility if researchers all chose different inputs and outputs (Cooper, Seiford, & 
Zhu, 2004). These determinants primarily include basic hospital characteristics such as number 
of beds and staff, while including outputs such as profit and number of cases. In a paper 
evaluating the emergency units of hospitals in Montreal (Ouellette & Vierstrate, 2002), the 
authors chose to include quasi-fixed inputs and outputs, i.e. factors that are not dependent on 
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number of hours worked but change with employment. The inputs used in the analysis included 
number of physicians, labor hours excluding those of physicians, furniture and equipment 
expenditures, and number of stretchers while the outputs consisted only of number of cases. In 
another paper, Gruca and Nath (2000) evaluated the effect hospital ownership, size, and location 
had on efficiency. The authors chose determinants that would reflect these aspects. The inputs 
used included staffing information in the form of number of nurses, ancillary services, 
administration, cost of services and supplies, and total beds. The outputs considered included 
both inpatient and outpatient cases, and long term days of care. In both papers from Canada the 
authors chose to include similar determinants, despite the difference in topic of interest. This 
shows that there is somewhat of a trend in determinants when evaluating hospital efficiency.  
 In Taiwan, DEA papers were also written evaluating hospital efficiency, but as with the 
efficiency papers in Canada, these studies were conducted with different interests in mind. 
Chang (1998) evaluated differences in hospital efficiency between government and private 
hospitals pre-implementation of the NHI in 1995. Its inputs were composed solely from staff 
information including physicians, nurses, administration while its outputs contained number of 
clinic visits, and also contained general, acute, and chronic patient days. The author chose not to 
include capital inputs because Taiwan’s central government supplies all health providers 
similarly. He also claims that the costs are beyond the control of the hospitals in Taiwan. Chang 
et al. (2004) examined the reform’s effect on hospital efficiency by running analyses from 
multiple years. The authors avoided capital measures as well but included more hospital 
characteristics. The inputs included patient beds, doctors, nurses, medical support, and ancillary 
personnel. Its outputs included patient days, clinic visits, and number of patients receiving 
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surgeries.  There have been no papers illustrating the change in hospital efficiency in 
Massachusetts post-reform thus far. In hospital efficiency papers, researchers advise avoiding the 
use of physicians as an input in teaching hospitals, since they do not always focus on the care of 
their patients and can be working on other projects (Cooper, et al., 2004). 
 By reviewing the literature, a list of inputs and outputs was enumerated. A table 
describing where the inputs and outputs were found is shown below. As seen from the table, all 
physical inputs and outputs were used previously in literature.  
Table 8: Inputs and Outputs in Literature 
Inputs 
Chang et al., 
2004 
Chang, 1998 
Gruca & 
Nath, 2001 
Cooper et al., 
2004 
Number of Beds x X x  
Number of 
Physicians 
x X   
Number of Licensed 
Nurses 
x X x  
Number of Nurse 
Practitioners 
x X x x 
Auxiliary Employees x X x x 
Other Employees   x x 
Supply Expenditures   x  
Outputs 
Chang et al., 
2004 
Chang, 1998 
Gruca & 
Nath, 2001 
Cooper et al., 
2004 
Inpatient Cases   x  
Outpatient Cases   x  
Total Patient Days x X  x 
Inpatient Surgeries x X  x 
Outpatient Surgeries x X   
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5.3 Data Envelopment Analysis and Regression 
 A key paper illustrating the methodology similar to that which will be conducted in this 
paper is Chang et al., (2004). This paper used DEA to evaluate the efficiency of hospitals in 
Taiwan from 1994 to 1997, excluding the year of implementation of the NHI program in 1995. 
The paper also aims to assess the changes in hospital performance following the implementation 
of the National Health Insurance program. The data used was in the form of surveys distributed 
to accredited district hospitals; the largest group of health care service providers in Taiwan. The 
authors chose to use DEA analysis in order to measure relative efficiency in terms of physical 
inputs and outputs, instead of using capital. “Input cost and output price are often times 
susceptible to wide variations and managerial manipulations across comparable units” (Chang, 
Chang, Das, & Li, 2004, p. 484). The inputs the paper employed included number of patient beds 
and the amount of staff available (i.e. number of doctors, nurses, and medical support personnel 
including ancillary services). The three outputs considered were length of stay, number of patient 
visits, and number of patients receiving surgery. In order to compare hospital efficiency across 
time, the researchers utilized window analysis. The results from the DEA analysis were tested 
statistically with student t-tests to prove the difference in efficiency from before and after the 
reform. The efficiency scores were then used as dependent variables for a regression model 
aiming to determine which hospital factors had a greater impact on the change in efficiency 
obtained from DEA. The hospital factors used included hospital ownership, local market 
competition, illness severity, number of departments, teaching status, a dummy variable for NHI 
status, degree of specialization, and ratio of nursing hours to patient days.  The results of the 
regression found that degree of specialization, defined as the number of departments, was linked 
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to the increase operating efficiency. The NHI coefficient was negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, meaning that the researchers were 99% confident of the NHI having a 
significant impact on hospital efficiency. The remaining variables were found to be statistically 
insignificant. Using this method, the data suggests that the average operating efficiency 
decreased after the implementation of the NHI program in 1995. 
 In Chang (1998), a different population consisting of only government hospitals was 
used, and its goal was to evaluate the relative efficiency of government hospitals in Taiwan from 
1990 to 1994 (i.e. prior to the reform). The paper employed the same combination of DEA and 
regression also found in Chang et al. (2004) in two separate stages to determine the overall 
efficiency and its variations within the aforementioned timeframe. The inputs used only staffing 
information in the form of number of full time equivalent physicians, licensed nurses, and 
medical support personnel. The outputs used included acute and chronic patient days, and the 
total number of clinic visits. The DEA analysis gave efficiency scores for each hospital which 
were used as dependent variables in a regression analysis. The independent variables used for the 
regression analysis included scope (number of departments), occupancy rate, a dummy variable 
(year) for the year, and proportion of retired veteran patients. The analysis showed that hospitals 
with higher occupational rates performed better than those with a lower amount of occupation 
rates and a wider variety of offered services. The paper explains that the scope of services 
offered and the proportion of retired veterans seeking medical services negatively impacted 
hospital efficiency while general occupancy of a hospital positively affected efficiency.  Also, 
the study reveals a steady increase in relative efficiency of public hospitals leading up to the 
reform. This could be due, in part, to the anticipation of the NHI program or by accumulated 
 
 
34  
 
operating experience; an unintentional increase in efficiency due to improvement in hospital 
management. 
 Gruca and Nath (2000) is an important paper that utilizes DEA to determine the relative 
efficiency of hospitals in Canada. This paper focused on hospital size, ownership, and location to 
determine if these factors have an effect on hospital efficiency.  The authors focused on 
community hospitals in Ontario, Canada.  In the analysis, the authors sampled 168 community 
hospitals and separated them by ownership. Twenty two of the community hospitals are 
religious; fourteen are government run, while the remaining 132 hospitals are secular, non-profit. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was then performed to determine whether or not hospital efficiency was 
statistically significant with regards to ownership. To measure efficiency based on hospital size 
the authors separated their sample by number of beds each hospital contained. They separated 
the hospitals into three groups. The first group was hospitals which had less than one hundred 
beds, second was one hundred to three hundred and fifty beds, and the last group contained 
hospitals with more than three hundred and fifty beds. When testing efficiency for hospital 
location, the authors based their analysis of the size of the population receiving service. After 
their analysis the authors found that there is no significant difference in efficiency based off of 
ownership, location or hospital size.  
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6.0 Methodology 
6.1 Intro 
 Our main objective is to evaluate the relative efficiency of short-term acute facilities in 
Massachusetts in order to determine if any changes have occurred since the implementation of 
the reform. In order to do so we will conduct efficiency tests using data envelopment analysis. 
The resulting efficiency scores will then be used to calculate the malmquist indices of the 
hospitals in order to observe the overall change in productivity throughout the given time period. 
Also, change in efficiency will also be observed through window analysis. Regression will then 
be used to evaluate whether or not the reform was a significant factor in the change of hospital 
efficiency. The results of the analysis will be compared and any noticeable trends between the 
two will be noted. We expect that after comparison of our two quantitative analyses, the two will 
reinforce each other. 
6.2 Data Envelopment Analysis  
 To complete the quantitative aspect of our analysis, we will use data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to measure relative hospital efficiency before and after the reform. DEA is a non-
parametric form of analysis that uses a set list of factors sorted into inputs and outputs to 
compare a list of decision making units (DMUs). DMUs are the units compared to each other in 
order to determine relative efficiency; common DMUs are bank branches, hospitals, and various 
businesses.  In our analysis, the decision making units will be short-term acute hospitals in 
Massachusetts. The analysis uses inputs and outputs to determine the most efficient DMUs, 
called the best practices. With these best practices, a frontier is created that will be used to 
determine the efficiencies of the remaining DMUs not already on the frontier. Each inefficient 
DMU is compared to the frontier and given a relative efficiency score correlating to the distance 
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between the DMU under evaluation and the frontier; a process known as benchmarking. The 
efficiency scores range from zero (least efficient) to one (best practices) (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). 
The model used is an input-oriented envelopment model, meaning the program compares input 
between DMUs while keeping output static in order to determine the results. This was chosen 
due to the nature of hospitals; hospital can do little to affect the amount of patients it receives per 
year. The study will also utilize both variable return to scale (VRS) and constant return to scale 
(CRS).VRS is an assumption in which the program simply assumes a non-constant return to 
scale, either increasing or decreasing, while CRS assumes a linear scale between inputs and 
outputs. The model used in this study is a variation of one found in Sherman and Zhu (2006). 
The model illustrated from Sherman and Zhu as well as our edited model are shown below. 
Table 9: DEA Input and Output 
Sherman & Zhu, 2006 Our Variation 
Input 
Weighted Acute Beds Total Beds (Beds) 
Long Term Beds 
FTE Registered Nurses Full Time Registered Nurses (RN) 
FTE Licensed Nurses Full Time Licensed Nurses (LN) 
FTE Other Clinical Labor - 
FTE Non Clinical Labor Full Time Other Labor (Other) 
FTE Long Term Labor - 
Output 
Case Mix Adjusted Discharges - 
Acute Care Patient Days Total Patient Days (PD) 
Long Term Care Days 
Outpatient Visits Total Outpatient Visits (OV) 
Ambulatory Surgeries Total Surgeries (Surg) 
Inpatient Surgeries 
 Substitutions for the illustrated model were made due primarily to issues with data 
acquisition. The alteration of the model could potentially result in significant changes to the 
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resulting efficiency scores, due to the envelopment model taking different factors into 
consideration. In the variation, total beds will be used instead of acute and long term beds, total 
surgeries is used instead of ambulatory and inpatient surgeries, and patient days is used instead 
of acute care patient and long term days. The envelopment model will be run once for every year 
between 2004 and 2008 for calculation of the malmquist scores and once for every time period in 
the window analysis, discussed later. 
6.2.1 Malmquist                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 With the efficiency scores for each year determined through the envelopment model, the 
Malmquist productivity scores will be calculated. Färe, Grosskopf, & Lovell (1994) derived a 
specialized DEA based productivity index for calculating change in productivity over time for 
each unit, or DMU. The equation shown below is one for input-based scores.  
 
Cook & Zhu (2008) 
 In this equation, θt0 (x
t
o, yt0) and tθ
t+1
0(x
t+1
o, yt
+1
0) are single period efficiency 
measurements at time t and t+1, respectively. Both θt0 (x
t+1
o, yt
+1
0) and t θ
t+1
0(x
t
o, yt0) are mixed 
period measurements of efficiency; measurements that account for the change in time. The first 
mixed measure compares DMUs at time period t+1 to benchmarks at t while the second 
compares DMUs from time t to benchmarks at time t+1. The first portion of the equation 
calculates the change in technical efficiency between time periods t and t+1 while the second 
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portion evaluates the shift in the frontier. The use of this equation requires the calculation of two 
single periods and two mixed periods. The single periods are the results of the input-oriented 
envelopment model described earlier. The mixed periods are the result of the comparison of the 
efficiency scores of one year with the benchmarks of another year.  If the resulting Mo is below 
or above one, productivity increased or decreased between the two time periods, respectively. If 
the number is exactly one, productivity remained the same.  The same observations may be 
recorded for the individual portions of the equation (change in technical efficiency and frontier 
shift). 
6.2.2 Window Analysis 
 Window analysis, utilized in Chang (1998) and Chang (2004), takes a different approach 
to comparing DMUs across time. Window Analysis is a method that allows the consolidation of 
separate time periods by treating the same units in different time periods as separate entities. The 
use of window analysis requires the assumption of no significant progress in technology.  Data 
for DMUs will be divided into two time groups, a pre-reform period (2004-2005) and a post-
reform period (2007-2008). Data envelopment models will be run for both groups and the two 
periods will be compared using Wilcoxon’s two sample test; a non-parametric variation of 
typical t-tests. 
6.3 Regression 
 DEA cannot be used to determine the reason why the efficiency of a DMU changes over 
time, therefore additional analysis to supplement the results is required. Regression will be used 
in the second portion of the analysis to evaluate the reason influencing change in hospital 
efficiency, if any. The efficiency scores obtained from the DEA analysis will be used as the 
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dependent variable, and a number of determinants known to influence hospital efficiency will be 
used as independent variables in the analysis. Scope, defined as the total number of hospital 
departments, was found to be negative and statistically significant in Chang (1998). Redefined as 
degree of service specialization in Chang (2004), it was found to be positive and statistically 
significant. Occupancy rate, defined as total patient days/ (beds*365), was found to be positive 
and statistically significant in Chang (1998). To determine whether the reform had an impact on 
hospital efficiency, the dummy variable reform will be included in the analysis as in Chang 
(2004); pre-reform will be considered as zero while post-reform will be considered as one. The 
three factors will form the equation shown below, where beta signifies coefficients relating to 
their perspective variables. 
Efficiency = βo + β1Scope + β2Reform + β3Occupancy  
6.4 Challenges & Limitations of DEA 
DEA has the capability of determining efficiency while taking multiple factors into 
consideration, but its use requires knowledge of its limitations. It is important to note that DEA is 
only capable of determining relative efficiency of DMUs, meaning the efficiency scores for all 
DMUs depends on the amount of DMUs in the analysis and how efficient they are. This attribute 
makes DEA suitable for determining efficiency when an efficiency standard isn’t already 
established. When an efficiency standard is available, DEA is an unnecessary method. Capital 
input and output are subject to a wide variety of factors including inflation, geological variations, 
and different vendor rates, and are therefore not best suited for DEA analysis (Sherman & Zhu, 
2006). One must also take precaution when choosing sample size and models, as an insufficient 
amount could weaken the results of the analysis.  It is best to have a high proportion of DMUs to 
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the number of inputs and outputs in the model. It is also recommended in Sherman and Zhu 
(2006) that researchers use similar models compared to those used previously in order to 
facilitate the comparison of results between papers. 
There are challenges associated with the use of DEA to evaluate efficiency over time. 
DEA, as stated previously, is a method that allows the comparison of multiple inputs and outputs 
to determine relative efficiency of firms. Although it is a useful tool for spotting inefficiencies, 
one must take into account that DEA alone is incapable of comparing efficiencies over periods of 
time. Therefore, research was done to find different methods used previously in literature with 
the same issue. Chang (1998) and Chang (2004) illustrated ways in which to overcome this issue 
while also using regression. Literature was found using malmquist scores to effectively measure 
change in productivity, but none used regression in addition with malmquist to determine factors 
that were significant in the change in efficiency.   
6.5 Qualitative Data 
  In order to conduct a formal interview, the first step to insure a productive session is to 
make sure that an appropriate amount of research on the topic in question has been conducted 
prior to the interview. When there is certain confidence in the amount of research, the next step 
is to prepare questions for the interviewee, organize all thoughts and determine good candidates 
to interview. Once those candidates have been identified, they will be contacted to see if they 
would be willing to participate in an interview and if so, set up an appropriate date and time. 
When conducted, the interview will be recorded and later reviewed to pick up on fine details 
overlooked during interview and to write an appropriate summary. A thank you note will then be 
sent to those interviewed as well as a summary of the interview to insure accuracy. Some issues 
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that may arise when conducting an interview are privacy concerns. There are many who prefer 
not to be visually or verbally recorded. In addition to this, some may choose not to disclose 
certain information about their hospitals or their opinions on a matter.  
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7.0 Data 
7.1 Data Collection 
 A list of 65 short term acute care hospitals was obtained from the Massachusetts Division 
of Finance Health Care and Policy (DHCFP). This list is representative of the majority of short 
term acute care hospital in Massachusetts. The list contained some hospitals at the system level 
while others were at the individual level. Although the entire sample set is comprised of short 
term acute care facilities, there are variations in ownership, as shown by the chart below 
 
Figure 1: Type of Control  
 This table illustrates the percentage of hospitals pertaining to a specific type of 
ownership. As seen in the graph, the majority of the hospitals (80%) in the data set are voluntary 
nonprofit facilities. The remaining 20% belong to multiple other hospital controls of varying 
types. The majority of hospitals excluded from the study included specialized care facilities, 
nursing homes, and psychiatric hospitals. The hospital data used in the study was acquired 
through the American Hospital Association (AHA). Data for some hospitals was either missing 
or not recorded, and the amount of sources from which data was collected was kept to a 
80% 
3% 
11% 
6% 
Voluntary Nonprofit
Governmental
Voluntary Nonprofit, Church
Proprietary, Corporation
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minimum. This was done in order to reduce discrepancies and also to prevent mistakes when 
filling in information. Data for DMU # 31 was nonexistent in the AHA data for the year 2008, 
despite verification that it was still active. Also, data for total surgical procedures was missing 
for DMU # 20 and 21for 2004-2007 and 2008, respectively.  
7.2 Challenges and Limitations 
  There are multiple challenges associated with data collection. It is difficult to find a free 
source that offers all of the information necessary for the analysis. Therefore, at the beginning of 
the study we resorted to using multiple data sources for information. This was a potential issue, 
as some data sources are more reliable than others and sometimes display different information. 
In addition, some data sources displayed information in an inefficient manner, requiring the user 
to record data datum by datum. This method of data collection was time consuming and 
facilitated mistakes that could have been costly later in the analysis. In addition, overcoming data 
format issues between sources of information is both a limitation and a challenge. Different data 
sources refer to hospitals using different names, and thus it becomes confusing as to what is the 
correct name of the hospital the data is referring to. In some data sources, hospital information is 
given on the system level and not on the individual level, which introduces another limitation to 
the study. Aside from lowering the amount of DMUs, hospitals on the system level are 
considered one unit, which might influence the DMUs efficiency score in the envelopment 
model. By the end of the study, a more user friendly spreadsheet was provided through the AHA. 
Though it did not provide all of the recommended data for the analysis, it provided data that 
would otherwise be unobtainable through previous means. Overall, issues with data collection 
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can be solved by thoroughly documenting and handling data with the upmost care to detail in 
order to prevent discrepancies in the data used for the analysis. 
 Conducting interviews posed more challenges along with data collection during the 
study. Finding interviewees for the study was difficult due to the nature of our analysis, which 
made employees in management positions preferred interviewees. Also, DEA is relatively new 
compared to most statistical analyses available today, and therefore it proved difficult to explain 
the concept to those unfamiliar with it. 
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8.0 Results 
8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Prior to using DEA, the summary statistics for all DMUs were calculated in order to 
record any noticeable trends in the data. The results of the descriptive statistics are shown below 
with more information, including trends in averages, shown in the Appendix.  
Table 10: Summary Statistics 
Variables  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Inputs           
Beds           
Average 223.7 224.7 224.4 226.8 228.7 
Standard Deviation 196.72 198.48 199.11 201.91 202.93 
Minimum 898 902 902 907 907 
Maximum 13 13 13 12 12 
RN           
Average 261.3 257.6 257.9 297.0 311.3 
Standard Deviation 348.22 347.40 361.77 402.50 404.91 
Minimum 14 12 13 15 15 
Maximum 1832 1824 1979 2186 2216 
LP           
Average 14.6 11.8 11.1 12.3 12.1 
Standard Deviation 22.63 16.53 15.93 16.34 16.78 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 106 77 74 64 69 
Other           
Average 963.7 909.0 852.2 919.6 966.6 
Standard Deviation 1374.60 1133.98 1081.72 1188.53 1241.88 
Minimum 66 57 57 55 58 
Maximum 9085 6077 5969 6328 6169 
Outputs           
OV           
Average 283505.5 280442.9 286712.6 287442.0 312122.3 
Standard Deviation 224887.17 233331.64 248130.95 246693.25 255419.65 
Minimum 12729 13296 13127 14880 17080 
Maximum 912976 925966 1168203 985356 982221 
Days           
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Average 60366.3 59935.3 60625.2 60533.8 61389.3 
Standard Deviation 58883.31 58182.03 58704.46 59392.97 60487.45 
Minimum 2236 1651 1597 1672 1690 
Maximum 295694 266743 270035 272014 275119 
Surg.           
Average 11505.2 11132.4 10372.2 10063.5 10341.3 
Standard Deviation 10334.53 10156.44 8761.43 8668.08 8194.44 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 47170 45318 40053 37448 36701 
 
 As shown by the table, there exists a high amount of variability in the data, which was 
expected from the research team. Hospitals in Massachusetts range from small care facilities to 
multi-building teaching facilities that serve hundreds of patients each day. Also, it is important to 
note that all inputs and outputs increased over time, with the exception of licensed nurses and 
total surgical operations. Many of the averages increased significantly from 2006-2007, most 
notably the input for other employees. This occurrence was also noted in Chang (2004), where 
inputs and outputs increased between pre and post reform periods. Graphs illustrating the change 
in average for each input and output are in the Appendix. 
8.2 Malmquist 
 Change in productivity over time was measured using the Malmquist formula derived 
specifically for DEA. Change was measured between groups of two years in succession (from 
04-05, 05-06, 06-07, and 07-08). Malmquist values were first calculated under the assumption of 
VRS; the raw results can be found in the Appendix. The values for change in technical efficiency 
and frontier shift were calculated separately to add another means of comparison. The results of 
the analysis are summarized in the table below. 
Table 11: Malmquist VRS Results 
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 The results shown in the table represent the average for all measurements of every time 
period evaluated. Period A represents the first year in the group and period B represents the 
succeeding year. Model A Frontier B and Model B Frontier A are both mixed period measure 
explained in the methodology. The first represents efficiency in period A with respect to the 
frontier in period B, and Model B Frontier A represents the opposite.  As seen in the tale, there is 
a significant amount of variability in the data; this stems from the results of the variable 
benchmark models (columns 4 and 5), which are used to calculate the frontier shift and 
malmquist index. Many scores from the variable benchmark model were excluded from the 
analysis due to infeasibility, the total number of which is demonstrated in the final column. 
Infeasibility occurs in VRS variable benchmark models when the DMUs under evaluation are 
too far from the frontier for an accurate comparison. A figure illustrating the range of 
infeasibility is shown below. 
 
 
 
Year A B 
Model 
A 
Frontier 
B 
Model 
B 
Frontier 
A 
Δ 
Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# of 
infeasible 
measures 
04-05 0.93325 0.94401 1.08352 1.16382 0.99376 1.03543 1.03558 12 
05-06 0.94401 0.95630 1.58923 0.55333 0.99143 2.34877 2.33104 34 
06-07 0.95630 0.94002 0.41840 3.08956 1.02495 0.59963 2.95675 90 
07-08 0.94002 0.94698 1.03085 0.39133 1.00382 2.12944 2.23164 20 
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Fig. 2: Infeasibility (Cook & Zhu, 2008) 
 For input oriented variable benchmark models, a unit will be infeasible if it is above the 
line E” to C. This region is separated into two cases; case one and case two. Case one occurs 
when the DMU under evaluation has the least amount of input and a higher amount of output 
compared to the frontier, while in case two the DMU only has a higher amount on output when 
compared to the frontier. In both cases, one could make the argument that all DMUs that are 
infeasible are more efficient than the frontier evaluating it. This allowed the team to draw some 
conclusions from the VRS malmquist results. In the variable benchmark model comparing 
efficiency of 2007 to the frontier in 2006, approximately 94% of all units were infeasible. This 
signifies a jump in output from 2006 to 2007. When compared to the summary statistics, the two 
observations coincide; there was a significant jump in output in both areas of analysis. In 
addition, there was an observed increase in input as well from 2006 to 2007 in the summary 
statistics, leading to the belief that that majority of infeasible units are most likely to be in the 
case two region of the figure shown above, since both input and output increased over time. 
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 According to the table, specifically the malmquist index, the increase in measurement 
signifies a decrease in overall productivity from 2004 to 2008. This may not be the case 
however, due to the omission of infeasible units in the data. Therefore the results from the 
malmquist VRS are inconclusive.  
 The prevalence of infeasible units in the VRS malmquist data influenced the team to 
attempt the same type of analysis while assuming CRS. With this assumption, there are increased 
limitations; assuming CRS in the hospital environment assumes a stricter relationship between 
input and output. The assumption of CRS in this particular model of inputs and outputs signifies 
that, for example, employees across all hospitals are capable of handling the same number of 
cases per year. The advantage to CRS is that values are always feasible, so any apparent trends 
not observed in the VRS malmquist will be noted and more importantly, conclusions may be 
drawn from the analysis. The same procedure was followed as in the VRS malmquist, with 
change in productivity being calculated in groups of two years in succession. A summary table 
was created with the results and is shown below. 
Table 12: Malmquist CRS Results 
Year A B 
Model A 
Frontier 
B 
Model B 
Frontier 
A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
04-05 0.88035 0.88654 0.96645 0.96105 0.99924 1.02209 1.01831 
05-06 0.88654 0.91572 0.98840 1.01584 0.98004 1.01430 0.99441 
06-07 0.91572 0.89567 1.02659 0.91359 1.03031 1.05245 0.95155 
07-08 0.89567 0.89941 0.93404 0.93794 1.01664 1.00037 1.01553 
  Compared to the VRS results, the CRS results are much more uniform and either remain 
static or follow a trend. As seen from this table, there are no significant changes in average 
technical efficiency, although the data suggests that overall technical efficiency decreased over 
time. The value representing frontier shift remains static, and malmquist index values suggest 
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that efficiency increased from 2004 to 2006, and then decreased following those years. There is a 
slight decrease in all aspects excluding malmquist index starting at or around the reform period 
(06-07). Although misleading, this observation includes both mixed period measures (Model A 
Frontier B and Model B Frontier A). Regardless of this observation, there is no significant 
change in productivity captured with this analysis. 
8.3 Window Analysis 
 Window analysis was performed twice with DEA, once assuming VRS and the other 
CRS. Raw data for both tests are shown in the appendix.  Mean values for VRS pre and post 
reform were 0.91583 ± .107 and 0.92280 ± .106, respectively. The percent of efficient DMUs 
was 45.4% pre reform and 41.1% post reform, respectively. The resulting efficiency scores were 
higher than expected, but consistent with literature. A Wilcoxon’s two sample test was 
performed to test whether or not efficiency increased after the reform. The resulting p-value was 
insignificant, suggesting that there were no significant differences in efficiency from 2004-2008. 
The same method was performed using CRS envelopment scores, and resulted in different 
values. Mean values for CRS pre and post reform were 0.84291 ± .126 and 0.86523 ± .123, 
respectively. The percentage of efficient DMUs was 21.5% pre-reform and 24% post-reform. 
Compared to the efficiency scores assuming VRS, the CRS scores are significantly lower with 
fewer efficient DMUs. Also, overall efficiencies seem to increase in both cases. A one-tailed 
Wilcoxon’s two sample test was performed on CRS values, with an alternative hypothesis that 
efficiency increased from 2004-2008. The resulting p-value was significant (p < .05), suggesting 
that efficiency increased from 2004-2008. Regression was performed using the efficiency scores 
from CRS window analysis as the dependent variable in order to determine what factors played a 
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role in the change in efficiency. The independent variables used in this study included scope, 
reform, and occupancy rate (explained in methodology). The regression model followed a linear 
fitting. Its R
2
, a statistical measure of how well the equation models the data, was 0.17. The 
linear fitting regression resulted in the following description of coefficients shown below. 
Table 13: Regression Coefficients 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.63511 0.036835 17.24222 <0.00001 
Scope -0.00194 0.001662 -1.16559 0.24487 
Reform 0.019729 0.014913 1.322941 0.18704 
Occupancy Rate 0.331418 0.04703 7.047022 <0.00001 
 
 The table shows the significance and coefficients of factors relating to the change in 
efficiency observed in CRS window analysis. The regression equation, using the coefficients 
above, would create the following equation. 
Efficiency = 0.63511 - 0.00194Scope + 0.019729Reform + 0.331418Occupancy 
 The coefficient for scope was negative just as in Chang (1998), but it was found to be 
insignificant. The key variable of the study, reform, was positive and insignificant, suggesting 
that the reform had no significance in regards to the change in efficiency observed in window 
analysis. Occupancy rate was positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that patient 
volume in hospitals was a significant factor in the change in efficiency.  
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9.0 Conclusion and Future Work 
 The results of the malmquist VRS and CRS and those of the window analysis VRS and 
CRS were compared to determine any noticeable trends in the data, excluding the regression 
results. While the number of infeasible units was abnormally high in 2006 to 2007, the same was 
not found in the CRS malmquist results. In fact, a Wilcoxon’s two sample test was performed on 
the mixed period measures in 06-07 to determine whether there was a significant decrease in 
efficiency between 2006 and 2007. The resulting p-value was significant at the 1% level, 
confirming that the two analyses yielded entirely different results. This could be due to either the 
choice in return to scale or a mistake in the linear programming used to calculate the mixed 
period measures. A more detailed study should be performed in the future to evaluate the change 
in efficiency between 2006 and 2007 in more detail. The results of both window analyses were 
more reasonable with respect to similarity. The mean efficiency scores of both analyses seem to 
increase over time, with mean efficiency scores for window CRS being lower than those of the 
VRS. The differences in all four analyses are most likely to be attributed to the returns to scale 
that were chosen for the analysis. The choosing of multiple returns to scale was a result of the 
research team being unsure of how to characterize hospital behavior, warranting more of an 
investigation of the similarities of hospitals with respect to employee performance standards. For 
the purposes of the study, the assumption of VRS seems more realistic since not all employees 
across all hospitals are likely to handle the same load everyday throughout every year.  
 The results of the regression for the window CRS results suggest that there is no direct 
link between the significant change in efficiency scores noted and the implementation of the 
reform in 2006. On the other hand, occupancy rate was determined as a significant factor in the 
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analysis. This could be argued as an indirect effect of the reform. The increase in coverage rates 
of public programs such as MassHealth and a mandate on the population could have had an 
impact on hospital utilization, more specifically an increase in hospital usage. This coincides 
with the increase in both input and output observed prior to the analysis in the descriptive 
statistics. An increase in output (visits, days, and surgeries), after a certain point, would require 
an increase in resources. A similar phenomenon was observed in Taiwan, where there was an 
increase in both input and output noted in the reform’s timeframe. In the future, a study 
evaluating the increase in hospital utilization and whether or not it was influenced by the reform 
could be analyzed and serve to supplement the results in this study. 
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11.1 Average Statistics 
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11.2 Window Analysis Results 
CRS  VRS  
DMU # 
2004-
2005 
2007-
2008 DMU # 2004-2005 2007-2008 
1 0.92953 0.95445 1 0.93134 0.96255 
2 1.00000 1.00000 2 1.00000 1.00000 
3 0.73003 0.79554 3 0.93837 0.97795 
4 0.73684 0.74336 4 0.76657 0.75032 
5 0.77570 0.86797 5 1.00000 1.00000 
6 0.82928 0.88432 6 0.86509 0.90250 
7 0.72309 0.78421 7 1.00000 1.00000 
8 0.76351 0.88765 8 1.00000 1.00000 
9 0.87847 1.00000 9 0.99608 1.00000 
10 0.85719 0.85543 10 1.00000 0.95775 
11 1.00000 0.85891 11 1.00000 0.85891 
12 0.92698 0.87054 12 0.93347 0.90014 
13 0.92019 1.00000 13 0.92633 1.00000 
14 0.79747 0.67589 14 0.79836 0.68398 
15 0.96091 0.86486 15 1.00000 0.86613 
16 1.00000 0.65198 16 1.00000 0.67316 
17 0.70501 0.78243 17 0.79195 1.00000 
18 0.72820 0.71009 18 0.81709 0.85168 
19 0.73721 0.77967 19 0.73825 0.78003 
20 0.84883 1.00000 20 0.88508 1.00000 
21 1.00000 1.00000 21 1.00000 1.00000 
22 0.55327 0.55461 22 0.98108 1.00000 
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23 0.80799 0.87151 23 0.81253 0.91888 
24 0.93900 0.93155 24 0.94161 0.93587 
25 1.00000 1.00000 25 1.00000 1.00000 
26 0.82982 0.91616 26 1.00000 0.97386 
27 0.66286 0.98847 27 0.69482 0.99267 
28 1.00000 1.00000 28 1.00000 1.00000 
29 0.76634 0.81377 29 0.78383 0.83969 
30 1.00000 1.00000 30 1.00000 1.00000 
31 0.96267 0.78868 31 0.98318 1.00000 
32 0.85151 1.00000 32 0.93132 1.00000 
33 0.85553 0.87190 33 1.00000 0.97158 
34 1.00000 0.92971 34 1.00000 0.93824 
35 0.83679 0.80163 35 0.83797 0.80236 
36 0.51014 0.74372 36 0.60761 1.00000 
37 0.71782 0.67435 37 0.84214 0.70450 
38 1.00000 1.00000 38 1.00000 1.00000 
39 0.80636 0.81771 39 1.00000 0.98336 
40 1.00000 1.00000 40 1.00000 1.00000 
41 1.00000 0.81736 41 1.00000 0.87449 
42 0.60875 0.59715 42 0.67072 0.60942 
43 0.76996 0.93486 43 0.96534 0.96105 
44 0.90422 1.00000 44 0.94676 1.00000 
45 0.86546 0.97297 45 0.87074 0.98325 
46 0.79417 0.84230 46 0.81627 0.85491 
47 1.00000 0.60876 47 1.00000 1.00000 
48 0.74010 0.58129 48 0.79530 0.63821 
49 1.00000 1.00000 49 1.00000 1.00000 
50 0.78321 1.00000 50 1.00000 1.00000 
51 0.75299 0.76707 51 0.80273 0.82606 
52 0.80381 1.00000 52 0.82091 1.00000 
53 0.69737 0.74619 53 0.84286 0.86087 
54 1.00000 0.88779 54 1.00000 0.90753 
55 1.00000 0.96872 55 1.00000 0.98131 
56 0.70310 0.69957 56 0.76788 0.70906 
57 0.92054 0.79509 57 1.00000 0.79799 
58 0.78484 0.84185 58 1.00000 0.91245 
59 0.88044 0.89286 59 1.00000 1.00000 
60 0.83558 0.80388 60 0.84258 0.82144 
61 0.71326 0.90555 61 0.80961 0.96404 
62 0.96489 0.85677 62 1.00000 0.95259 
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63 0.76573 0.82165 63 1.00000 1.00000 
64 0.80412 0.96618 64 0.92255 1.00000 
65 1.00000 1.00000 65 1.00000 1.00000 
66 0.92506 1.00000 66 0.97031 1.00000 
67 0.83942 1.00000 67 1.00000 1.00000 
68 0.70145 1.00000 68 0.88599 1.00000 
69 0.72047 0.75694 69 0.74541 0.79551 
70 0.86095 0.79853 70 1.00000 0.99064 
71 0.87310 0.77777 71 0.93085 0.78263 
72 0.66072 0.84091 72 1.00000 1.00000 
73 0.78117 0.89968 73 1.00000 0.93060 
74 1.00000 0.78999 74 1.00000 1.00000 
75 0.91009 0.87400 75 1.00000 1.00000 
76 1.00000 0.77660 76 1.00000 0.87099 
77 0.86740 1.00000 77 0.87882 1.00000 
78 1.00000 1.00000 78 1.00000 1.00000 
79 0.85360 0.84105 79 1.00000 0.88565 
80 0.85536 0.89210 80 0.85610 0.89656 
81 0.97775 0.57500 81 0.99073 0.58212 
82 0.72124 0.93266 82 0.81201 0.95674 
83 0.74524 0.71329 83 0.83270 1.00000 
84 0.73153 0.71140 84 0.73507 0.85745 
85 0.88997 0.75410 85 0.91548 0.75645 
86 0.84436 1.00000 86 0.96619 1.00000 
87 0.55898 1.00000 87 0.80096 1.00000 
88 0.87000 0.67720 88 0.87876 0.97453 
89 1.00000 0.90731 89 1.00000 0.97959 
90 0.96451 1.00000 90 0.96763 1.00000 
91 0.81696 0.97760 91 1.00000 1.00000 
92 0.68641 0.96006 92 0.70778 0.96074 
93 0.86029 0.95476 93 0.86883 0.95535 
94 0.73996 0.85687 94 0.75102 0.88044 
95 0.95983 0.88494 95 0.96137 0.90042 
96 1.00000 - 96 1.00000 - 
97 0.85841 0.95998 97 0.92202 0.96005 
98 0.88475 0.90005 98 1.00000 1.00000 
99 0.82414 0.99410 99 0.82423 1.00000 
100 0.76418 0.79108 100 0.76657 0.79113 
101 0.59579 0.74430 101 1.00000 1.00000 
102 0.65480 1.00000 102 0.74721 1.00000 
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103 1.00000 0.82704 103 1.00000 1.00000 
104 0.72418 0.98077 104 1.00000 0.99087 
105 0.95649 0.70692 105 1.00000 0.76126 
106 0.87012 0.54207 106 0.90453 0.54673 
107 0.50208 0.94079 107 0.54240 0.97919 
108 0.82509 0.87556 108 1.00000 0.90468 
109 0.93678 1.00000 109 0.97342 1.00000 
110 1.00000 0.81512 110 1.00000 0.82054 
111 0.74372 0.53575 111 0.79310 0.82623 
112 1.00000 0.68081 112 1.00000 0.71846 
113 0.70383 1.00000 113 0.75572 1.00000 
114 1.00000 1.00000 114 1.00000 1.00000 
115 0.85098 0.76318 115 0.95768 0.81228 
116 0.75764 0.96210 116 0.80382 0.96595 
117 0.70371 0.84411 117 0.70734 0.94195 
118 0.74936 1.00000 118 0.89565 1.00000 
119 0.94611 0.96305 119 0.97481 0.97165 
120 1.00000 0.63475 120 1.00000 0.64021 
121 0.53162 0.95983 121 0.56746 0.96723 
122 0.86132 1.00000 122 1.00000 1.00000 
123 0.73977 0.80721 123 0.82835 0.96327 
124 0.86645 0.88860 124 1.00000 1.00000 
125 1.00000 0.83933 125 1.00000 0.85215 
126 0.99354 1.00000 126 1.00000 1.00000 
127 0.84464 0.79733 127 0.95882 0.88903 
128 0.82877 0.88889 128 1.00000 1.00000 
129 0.80279 0.90814 129 1.00000 0.96760 
130 1.00000 0.93204 130 1.00000 0.93303 
Summary 
2004-
2005 
2006-
2007   2004-2005 2006-2007 
Mean 0.84291 0.86523 Mean 0.91517 0.92272 
Std. Dev. 0.12553 0.12299 Std. Dev. 0.10779 0.10646 
# of Efficient DMUs 28 31 # of Efficient DMUs 59 53 
Proportion 21.5% 24.0% Proportion 45.4% 41.1% 
Wilcoxon's sample test (2-tailed) Wilcoxon's sample test (2-tailed) 
P Value 0.045 P Value 0.4615 
Wilcoxon's sample test (1-tailed) Wilcoxon's sample test (1-tailed) 
P Value 0.0225 P Value 0.23075 
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11.3 Malmquist VRS 04-05 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A  
 Frontier B 
Model B  
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
 efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
 Index 
1 0.94069 1.00000 1.02785 0.97031 0.94069 1.06117 0.99824 
2 1.00000 1.00000 2.17334 1.16862 1.00000 1.36373 1.36373 
3 0.98445 0.89687 0.95629 0.93307 1.09765 0.96629 1.06064 
4 0.76882 0.77238 0.79759 0.75015 0.99539 1.03352 1.02875 
5 1.00000 1.00000 1.18386 1.14262 1.00000 1.01789 1.01789 
6 0.87257 0.97973 0.92664 0.93127 0.89063 1.05698 0.94138 
7 1.00000 1.00000 1.09402 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
8 1.00000 1.00000 1.00107 1.03340 1.00000 0.98423 0.98423 
9 1.00000 1.00000 0.99959 1.57542 1.00000 0.79655 0.79655 
10 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 7.40838 1.00000 - - 
11 1.00000 1.00000 1.17770 1.34663 1.00000 0.93518 0.93518 
12 1.00000 0.89240 0.95828 0.96769 1.12058 0.94006 1.05341 
13 0.92780 1.00000 1.09292 Infeasible 0.92780 - - 
14 0.81248 1.00000 0.85236 Infeasible 0.81248 - - 
15 1.00000 0.95945 1.07215 0.89875 1.04226 1.06984 1.11505 
16 1.00000 1.00000 1.11921 0.99466 1.00000 1.06076 1.06076 
17 0.82258 0.81201 0.79195 0.84372 1.01302 0.96259 0.97512 
18 0.82378 0.86758 0.84957 0.83782 0.94952 1.03341 0.98124 
19 0.74820 0.81069 0.85748 0.75478 0.92291 1.10948 1.02396 
20 1.00000 0.92588 0.89987 1.15878 1.08005 0.84794 0.91582 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.28021 0.96883 1.00000 1.14952 1.14952 
22 1.00000 0.85973 1.05383 0.84614 1.16315 1.03477 1.20359 
23 0.84402 0.99382 0.86329 0.89320 0.84927 1.06679 0.90599 
24 0.96540 1.00000 0.98896 1.23230 0.96540 0.91175 0.88021 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.59265 0.99349 1.00000 1.26613 1.26613 
26 1.00000 1.00000 1.81463 1.19505 1.00000 1.23226 1.23226 
27 0.79117 0.84564 0.84297 0.86786 0.93559 1.01891 0.95329 
28 1.00000 0.88447 1.17876 0.91454 1.13062 1.06771 1.20717 
29 0.79294 0.83077 0.89660 0.76557 0.95446 1.10771 1.05727 
30 1.00000 1.00000 1.16581 0.96426 1.00000 1.09955 1.09955 
31 1.00000 1.00000 1.01158 1.91300 1.00000 0.72718 0.72718 
32 1.00000 0.92882 0.96637 1.00738 1.07664 0.94393 1.01627 
33 1.00000 1.00000 1.11804 1.04086 1.00000 1.03641 1.03641 
34 1.00000 0.86684 1.19550 0.86380 1.15361 1.09532 1.26357 
35 0.86757 0.81091 0.88088 0.77746 1.06988 1.02908 1.10100 
36 0.61934 1.00000 0.64486 1.37497 0.61934 0.87020 0.53895 
37 0.90679 0.96595 1.01474 0.78725 0.93876 1.17178 1.10001 
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38 1.00000 1.00000 1.46354 1.23786 1.00000 1.08734 1.08734 
39 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
40 1.00000 1.00000 1.26064 1.02396 1.00000 1.10957 1.10957 
41 1.00000 1.00000 2.97958 0.91628 1.00000 1.80328 1.80328 
42 0.67404 0.56518 0.69516 0.54629 1.19261 1.03296 1.23192 
43 1.00000 1.00000 0.96727 1.16283 1.00000 0.91204 0.91204 
44 0.94728 1.00000 1.00135 0.97342 0.94728 1.04209 0.98715 
45 0.90839 1.00000 0.92217 1.37487 0.90839 0.85929 0.78056 
46 0.83374 0.84331 0.84383 0.80339 0.98865 1.03073 1.01902 
47 1.00000 1.00000 1.71606 1.24123 1.00000 1.17582 1.17582 
48 0.82826 1.00000 0.98221 0.81154 0.82826 1.20882 1.00123 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.20954 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
50 1.00000 0.96752 1.01209 1.08842 1.03357 0.94851 0.98035 
51 0.80540 0.85970 0.83974 0.80478 0.93685 1.05536 0.98871 
52 0.86779 0.86741 0.82860 0.73200 1.00044 1.06371 1.06417 
53 0.84484 0.93616 0.88234 0.89602 0.90245 1.04460 0.94270 
54 1.00000 1.00000 1.08550 1.06923 1.00000 1.00758 1.00758 
55 1.00000 1.00000 1.21315 1.10205 1.00000 1.04919 1.04919 
56 0.76802 0.58871 0.80236 0.57634 1.30458 1.03303 1.34767 
57 1.00000 1.00000 1.19509 1.15210 1.00000 1.01849 1.01849 
58 1.00000 0.82890 1.04980 0.89617 1.20642 0.98539 1.18879 
59 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
60 0.85260 1.00000 0.92318 1.17865 0.85260 0.95847 0.81719 
61 0.84232 1.00000 0.80961 Infeasible 0.84232 - - 
62 1.00000 1.00000 1.14022 0.95882 1.00000 1.09050 1.09050 
63 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
64 1.00000 1.00000 0.92255 1.26227 1.00000 0.85491 0.85491 
65 1.00000 1.00000 1.00755 3.40705 1.00000 0.54381 0.54381 
Summary A B 
Model A  
Frontier B 
Model B 
 Frontier A 
Δ Technical  
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist  
Index 
# 
Efficient 38 39           
% 58.5% 60.0%           
Mean 0.93325 0.94401 1.08352 1.16382 0.99376 1.03543 1.03558 
Std. Dev. 0.09582 0.09406 0.36006 0.92948 0.09887 0.16598 0.19241 
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11.4 Malmquist VRS 05-06 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 1.34477 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
2 1.00000 1.00000 4.99493 1.32262 1.00000 1.94334 1.94334 
3 0.89687 0.94825 0.88141 0.06078 0.94581 3.91556 3.70339 
4 0.77238 0.78604 0.81130 0.13515 0.98262 2.47171 2.42875 
5 1.00000 1.00000 1.18621 0.06644 1.00000 4.22546 4.22546 
6 0.97973 1.00000 0.96115 Infeasible 0.97973 - - 
7 1.00000 1.00000 1.01572 0.06090 1.00000 4.08380 4.08380 
8 1.00000 1.00000 0.99425 0.05124 1.00000 4.40513 4.40513 
9 1.00000 1.00000 2.99620 0.92763 1.00000 1.79720 1.79720 
10 1.00000 0.98611 Infeasible 0.10916 1.01408 - - 
11 1.00000 1.00000 1.24469 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
12 0.89240 1.00000 2.99620 Infeasible 0.89240 - - 
13 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
14 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
15 0.95945 0.80320 1.04957 0.37357 1.19454 1.53363 1.83198 
16 1.00000 1.00000 1.49810 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
17 0.81201 0.89985 0.87994 0.04004 0.90239 4.93481 4.45311 
18 0.86758 0.78501 1.85112 0.84102 1.10519 1.41122 1.55967 
19 0.81069 0.87186 0.95231 0.27904 0.92983 1.91583 1.78140 
20 0.92588 1.00000 2.40497 Infeasible 0.92588 - - 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.16465 0.88255 1.00000 1.14876 1.14876 
22 0.85973 0.84378 2.83277 1.02014 1.01890 1.65086 1.68206 
23 0.99382 0.90821 1.27159 0.91063 1.09426 1.12965 1.23612 
24 1.00000 1.00000 2.99620 0.49337 1.00000 2.46433 2.46433 
25 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
26 1.00000 1.00000 0.85928 0.15440 1.00000 2.35907 2.35907 
27 0.84564 1.00000 1.31162 0.42115 0.84564 1.91907 1.62284 
28 0.88447 1.00000 1.06887 0.33596 0.88447 1.89662 1.67751 
29 0.83077 0.91986 1.04382 Infeasible 0.90315 - - 
30 1.00000 1.00000 1.61178 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
31 1.00000 1.00000 2.95155 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
32 0.92882 1.00000 0.97119 Infeasible 0.92882 - - 
33 1.00000 1.00000 1.17490 0.05055 1.00000 4.82089 4.82089 
34 0.86684 0.89602 1.13580 0.72063 0.96744 1.27639 1.23483 
35 0.81091 0.85654 1.02953 0.29466 0.94673 1.92107 1.81874 
36 1.00000 1.00000 4.41672 4.08030 1.00000 1.04041 1.04041 
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37 0.96595 0.88136 2.27750 0.75056 1.09597 1.66393 1.82362 
38 1.00000 1.00000 2.43049 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
39 1.00000 1.00000 0.97124 0.03465 1.00000 5.29470 5.29470 
40 1.00000 1.00000 1.15662 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
41 1.00000 0.90541 1.59236 0.99522 1.10447 1.20361 1.32935 
42 0.56518 1.00000 0.57352 0.46045 0.56518 1.48453 0.83902 
43 1.00000 1.00000 1.02985 0.26859 1.00000 1.95814 1.95814 
44 1.00000 1.00000 1.38287 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
45 1.00000 1.00000 1.67871 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
46 0.84331 0.82162 0.92603 0.19547 1.02641 2.14840 2.20513 
47 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 0.91326 1.00000 - - 
48 1.00000 0.62829 1.73877 0.39613 1.59161 1.66068 2.64315 
49 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
50 0.96752 1.00000 1.14647 0.27975 0.96752 2.05810 1.99125 
51 0.85970 0.93398 1.23355 1.79179 0.92046 0.86483 0.79604 
52 0.86741 1.00000 1.38164 Infeasible 0.86741 - - 
53 0.93616 0.83072 1.18491 0.08324 1.12693 3.55407 4.00519 
54 1.00000 1.00000 2.99620 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
55 1.00000 1.00000 1.29249 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
56 0.58871 0.69376 0.59881 0.12862 0.84858 2.34235 1.98766 
57 1.00000 0.98762 1.30247 0.38428 1.01253 1.82959 1.85252 
58 0.82890 0.98004 0.84035 0.17008 0.84578 2.41702 2.04426 
59 1.00000 1.00000 1.08432 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
60 1.00000 1.00000 1.49810 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
61 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
62 1.00000 0.99193 1.86484 Infeasible 1.00813 - - 
63 1.00000 1.00000 0.99628 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
64 1.00000 1.00000 0.93084 0.24552 1.00000 1.94713 1.94713 
65 1.00000 1.00000 4.16276 0.85042 1.00000 2.21245 2.21245 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 39 43           
% 60.0% 66.2%           
Mean 0.94401 0.95630 1.58923 0.55333 0.99143 2.34877 2.33104 
Std. 
Dev. 0.09406 0.08168 0.95062 0.71164 0.11126 1.19205 1.18582 
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11.5 Malmquist VRS 06-07 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
2 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
3 0.94825 0.98890 0.05552 Infeasible 0.95889 - - 
4 0.78604 0.83168 0.12112 Infeasible 0.94512 - - 
5 1.00000 1.00000 0.09653 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
6 1.00000 0.94176 Infeasible Infeasible 1.06184 - - 
7 1.00000 1.00000 0.06052 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
8 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
9 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
10 0.98611 0.98214 0.11407 Infeasible 1.00404 - - 
11 1.00000 0.87404 Infeasible Infeasible 1.14411 - - 
12 1.00000 0.93112 Infeasible Infeasible 1.07398 - - 
13 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
14 1.00000 0.69125 Infeasible Infeasible 1.44665 - - 
15 0.80320 0.87377 0.35437 Infeasible 0.91923 - - 
16 1.00000 0.70557 Infeasible Infeasible 1.41730 - - 
17 0.89985 1.00000 0.05314 Infeasible 0.89985 - - 
18 0.78501 0.89693 0.61622 Infeasible 0.87521 - - 
19 0.87186 0.80919 0.25320 Infeasible 1.07746 - - 
20 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
21 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
22 0.84378 1.00000 1.01366 2.99620 0.84378 0.63321 3.03712 
23 0.90821 0.92195 0.56748 Infeasible 0.98510 - - 
24 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
25 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
26 1.00000 1.00000 0.15168 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
27 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
28 1.00000 1.00000 0.51190 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
29 0.91986 0.83988 0.54459 Infeasible 1.09523 - - 
30 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
31 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 2.82355 1.00000 - - 
32 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
33 1.00000 1.00000 0.06595 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
34 0.89602 0.97989 0.77074 Infeasible 0.91441 - - 
35 0.85654 0.81649 0.27508 Infeasible 1.04904 - - 
36 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 3.54227 1.00000 - - 
37 0.88136 0.70473 0.78196 Infeasible 1.25064 - - 
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38 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
39 1.00000 1.00000 0.03043 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
40 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
41 0.90541 0.91927 0.89952 Infeasible 0.98492 - - 
42 1.00000 0.66530 Infeasible Infeasible 1.50308 - - 
43 1.00000 0.99354 0.37409 Infeasible 1.00650 - - 
44 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
45 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
46 0.82162 0.90306 0.21364 Infeasible 0.90981 - - 
47 1.00000 1.00000 0.96001 2.99620 1.00000 0.56605 2.87638 
48 0.62829 0.63821 0.38279 Infeasible 0.98446 - - 
49 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
50 1.00000 1.00000 0.36301 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
51 0.93398 0.82606 0.98810 Infeasible 1.13065 - - 
52 1.00000 1.00000 0.94258 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
53 0.83072 0.92709 0.08132 Infeasible 0.89605 - - 
54 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
55 1.00000 0.99334 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00670 - - 
56 0.69376 0.78711 0.07403 Infeasible 0.88139 - - 
57 0.98762 0.81377 0.27040 Infeasible 1.21364 - - 
58 0.98004 1.00000 0.17315 Infeasible 0.98004 - - 
59 1.00000 1.00000 0.11061 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
60 1.00000 0.88699 0.60316 Infeasible 1.12740 - - 
61 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
62 0.99193 0.95849 0.93909 Infeasible 1.03489 - - 
63 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
64 1.00000 1.00000 0.24891 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
65 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 43 37           
% 66.2% 56.9%           
Mean 0.95630 0.94002 0.41840 3.08956 1.02495 0.59963 2.95675 
Std. Dev. 0.08168 0.09730 0.33915 0.31259 0.11723 0.04749 0.11366 
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11.6 Malmquist VRS 07-08 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ 
Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 1.02612 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
2 1.00000 1.00000 1.02122 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
3 0.98890 1.00000 1.03355 Infeasible 0.98890 - - 
4 0.83168 0.85054 0.76506 0.58723 0.97782 1.15429 1.12868 
5 1.00000 1.00000 1.05600 0.05754 1.00000 4.28406 4.28406 
6 0.94176 0.81745 0.92593 0.10923 1.15208 2.71256 3.12508 
7 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 0.09282 1.00000 - - 
8 1.00000 0.93844 1.03352 0.17752 1.06560 2.33744 2.49078 
9 1.00000 1.00000 1.07602 0.06099 1.00000 4.20036 4.20036 
10 0.98214 1.00000 0.96042 0.06458 0.98214 3.89137 3.82187 
11 0.87404 0.87099 0.90266 0.05879 1.00351 3.91151 3.92523 
12 0.93112 1.00000 0.95424 Infeasible 0.93112 - - 
13 1.00000 1.00000 1.13617 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
14 0.69125 1.00000 0.80740 0.62828 0.69125 1.36349 0.94251 
15 0.87377 1.00000 0.95878 0.28082 0.87377 1.97674 1.72721 
16 0.70557 0.58286 0.67554 0.07394 1.21053 2.74726 3.32565 
17 1.00000 1.00000 1.08761 1.05528 1.00000 1.01520 1.01520 
18 0.89693 1.00000 0.87138 0.19055 0.89693 2.25797 2.02525 
19 0.80919 0.87518 0.82308 0.63665 0.92459 1.18248 1.09331 
20 1.00000 0.79191 1.32006 0.20034 1.26277 2.28427 2.88451 
21 1.00000 1.00000 2.51347 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
22 1.00000 1.00000 1.17081 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
23 0.92195 1.00000 0.94281 0.97179 0.92195 1.02582 0.94576 
24 1.00000 1.00000 0.94179 0.92707 1.00000 1.00790 1.00790 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.15385 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
26 1.00000 1.00000 0.99126 0.34634 1.00000 1.69177 1.69177 
27 1.00000 1.00000 1.02368 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
28 1.00000 1.00000 1.13531 0.50847 1.00000 1.49426 1.49426 
29 0.83988 1.00000 0.95935 0.54563 0.83988 1.44688 1.21520 
30 1.00000 0.90489 1.11826 0.49772 1.10510 1.42586 1.57572 
31 1.00000 - 1.29166 - - - - 
32 1.00000 0.98521 1.04557 0.47729 1.01501 1.46909 1.49114 
33 1.00000 1.00000 0.97158 0.09958 1.00000 3.12360 3.12360 
34 0.97989 1.00000 0.98322 Infeasible 0.97989 - - 
35 0.81649 0.81453 0.84441 0.22731 1.00241 1.92506 1.92969 
36 1.00000 1.00000 1.09731 1.09865 1.00000 0.99939 0.99939 
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37 0.70473 1.00000 0.74235 Infeasible 0.70473 - - 
38 1.00000 1.00000 1.15360 0.03430 1.00000 5.79899 5.79899 
39 1.00000 1.00000 0.98456 0.76170 1.00000 1.13692 1.13692 
40 1.00000 0.79437 1.22418 0.27558 1.25885 1.87849 2.36474 
41 0.91927 0.57366 0.92365 0.06567 1.60248 2.96262 4.74755 
42 0.66530 0.99482 0.65576 0.55690 0.66876 1.32693 0.88740 
43 0.99354 1.00000 0.97788 0.57666 0.99354 1.30644 1.29800 
44 1.00000 1.00000 1.13563 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
45 1.00000 0.84187 0.98673 0.21452 1.18783 1.96782 2.33744 
46 0.90306 0.87027 0.87608 0.82623 1.03768 1.01086 1.04895 
47 1.00000 0.84704 1.27473 0.43840 1.18058 1.56938 1.85278 
48 0.63821 1.00000 0.76743 Infeasible 0.63821 - - 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.26793 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
50 1.00000 0.85478 1.13527 0.33101 1.16989 1.71221 2.00310 
51 0.82606 1.00000 0.89737 0.77391 0.82606 1.18477 0.97869 
52 1.00000 0.95345 1.04709 0.15834 1.04883 2.51097 2.63357 
53 0.92709 1.00000 0.89353 Infeasible 0.92709 - - 
54 1.00000 0.98689 0.91139 Infeasible 1.01329 - - 
55 0.99334 0.65803 1.02741 0.07079 1.50957 3.10072 4.68076 
56 0.78711 1.00000 0.74303 0.24633 0.78711 1.95761 1.54086 
57 0.81377 1.00000 0.82394 Infeasible 0.81377 - - 
58 1.00000 0.98082 0.96632 0.26661 1.01955 1.88546 1.92233 
59 1.00000 1.00000 Infeasible 0.12861 1.00000 - - 
60 0.88699 0.85796 0.82614 0.50844 1.03384 1.25366 1.29609 
61 1.00000 1.00000 0.96460 Infeasible 1.00000 - - 
62 0.95849 0.96732 1.05244 0.55491 0.99088 1.38350 1.37088 
63 1.00000 1.00000 1.37888 0.04044 1.00000 5.83949 5.83949 
64 1.00000 0.99339 1.06025 0.49625 1.00665 1.45685 1.46654 
65 1.00000 1.00000 1.62653 0.70118 1.00000 1.52306 1.52306 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ 
Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 37 40           
% 56.9% 62.5%           
Mean 0.94002 0.94698 1.03085 0.39133 1.00382 2.12944 2.23164 
Std. Dev. 0.09730 0.09953 0.25643 0.30125 0.15695 1.20815 1.35464 
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11.7 Malmquist CRS 04-05 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 0.93292 1.00000 1.02168 0.92517 0.93292 1.08799 1.01500 
2 1.00000 1.00000 2.01673 0.87179 1.00000 1.52096 1.52096 
3 0.77662 0.70145 0.73003 0.73644 1.10717 0.94623 1.04763 
4 0.75651 0.76411 0.78513 0.73725 0.99006 1.03713 1.02682 
5 0.88500 0.86095 0.77570 0.97460 1.02794 0.87994 0.90452 
6 0.86483 0.90180 0.87365 0.90630 0.95901 1.00258 0.96149 
7 0.77532 0.66267 0.72956 0.71162 1.17000 0.93609 1.09522 
8 0.84988 0.78117 0.76351 0.86953 1.08796 0.89838 0.97740 
9 1.00000 1.00000 0.87938 1.20720 1.00000 0.85349 0.85349 
10 0.93138 1.00000 0.99684 0.93294 0.93138 1.07108 0.99758 
11 1.00000 1.00000 1.14543 1.03844 1.00000 1.05025 1.05025 
12 1.00000 0.89234 0.95804 0.95889 1.12065 0.94422 1.05814 
13 0.92717 1.00000 1.08863 1.63519 0.92717 0.84737 0.78566 
14 0.81108 0.88929 0.84987 1.23001 0.91206 0.87038 0.79384 
15 1.00000 0.92418 0.96119 0.89875 1.08205 0.99418 1.07574 
16 1.00000 1.00000 1.02431 0.99324 1.00000 1.01552 1.01552 
17 0.78475 0.72124 0.70501 0.80282 1.08805 0.89839 0.97749 
18 0.75900 0.78786 0.77229 0.77387 0.96337 1.01780 0.98051 
19 0.74783 0.79957 0.82776 0.74571 0.93529 1.08942 1.01892 
20 1.00000 0.88997 0.84883 1.15271 1.12364 0.80954 0.90963 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.24262 0.88372 1.00000 1.18580 1.18580 
22 0.57455 0.64329 0.64575 0.58199 0.89313 1.11460 0.99548 
23 0.83918 0.96564 0.84687 0.88240 0.86904 1.05089 0.91326 
24 0.96464 1.00000 0.96832 1.17684 0.96464 0.92357 0.89091 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.16831 0.99006 1.00000 1.08630 1.08630 
26 0.90282 0.85818 0.87270 0.84735 1.05202 0.98944 1.04091 
27 0.76943 0.83323 0.82931 0.83583 0.92343 1.03656 0.95719 
28 1.00000 0.88048 1.11867 0.90291 1.13575 1.04445 1.18623 
29 0.77774 0.79562 0.85901 0.75646 0.97753 1.07781 1.05359 
30 1.00000 1.00000 1.14165 0.96100 1.00000 1.08995 1.08995 
31 1.00000 1.00000 1.00193 1.91043 1.00000 0.72419 0.72419 
32 0.88332 0.86706 0.88434 0.90340 1.01875 0.98025 0.99863 
33 0.96597 0.88475 0.85553 0.99977 1.09179 0.88532 0.96659 
34 1.00000 0.86246 1.17555 0.85078 1.15948 1.09164 1.26574 
35 0.86553 0.80809 0.88030 0.77649 1.07108 1.02881 1.10194 
36 0.56629 0.79438 0.56892 0.62016 0.71288 1.13440 0.80869 
37 0.76708 0.83931 0.87799 0.68845 0.91394 1.18127 1.07961 
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38 1.00000 1.00000 1.04577 1.21593 1.00000 0.92739 0.92739 
39 0.89757 0.72418 0.80636 0.80610 1.23942 0.89838 1.11347 
40 1.00000 1.00000 1.24781 0.96869 1.00000 1.13497 1.13497 
41 1.00000 0.94031 2.82054 0.88959 1.06348 1.72666 1.83627 
42 0.64927 0.53631 0.62102 0.53629 1.21062 0.97802 1.18401 
43 0.81525 0.84104 0.78314 0.87102 0.96934 0.96309 0.93357 
44 0.90681 0.98536 0.96908 0.94794 0.92028 1.05397 0.96995 
45 0.90261 1.00000 0.90433 1.36778 0.90261 0.85587 0.77251 
46 0.82695 0.81975 0.81286 0.77134 1.00878 1.02209 1.03106 
47 1.00000 1.00000 1.46722 1.11055 1.00000 1.14942 1.14942 
48 0.76088 0.98378 0.97336 0.71959 0.77343 1.32247 1.02284 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.20754 1.18073 1.00000 1.01129 1.01129 
50 0.82362 0.87008 0.82059 0.88683 0.94660 0.98869 0.93590 
51 0.75450 0.81266 0.81154 0.76063 0.92844 1.07200 0.99528 
52 0.85380 0.83332 0.80381 0.73199 1.02458 1.03526 1.06071 
53 0.74284 0.82838 0.79803 0.80017 0.89674 1.05459 0.94570 
54 1.00000 1.00000 1.07486 1.06358 1.00000 1.00529 1.00529 
55 1.00000 1.00000 1.17956 1.10038 1.00000 1.03536 1.03536 
56 0.75057 0.56322 0.72239 0.56739 1.33264 0.97744 1.30258 
57 0.93591 1.00000 1.19331 0.87507 0.93591 1.20708 1.12972 
58 0.79606 0.74185 0.80384 0.78232 1.07307 0.97854 1.05004 
59 0.88743 0.93097 0.96327 0.87768 0.95324 1.07301 1.02284 
60 0.84282 1.00000 0.91085 1.06790 0.84282 1.00599 0.84786 
61 0.79392 1.00000 0.71326 0.99354 0.79392 0.95092 0.75495 
62 1.00000 0.94632 1.01055 0.85258 1.05673 1.05908 1.11916 
63 0.78008 0.85270 0.84235 0.88249 0.91483 1.02146 0.93446 
64 0.82290 0.80577 0.81599 0.82605 1.02127 0.98349 1.00441 
65 1.00000 1.00000 1.00462 3.34367 1.00000 0.54814 0.54814 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 22 23           
% 33.8% 35.4%           
Mean 0.88035 0.88654 0.96645 0.96105 0.99924 1.02209 1.01831 
Std. Dev. 0.11291 0.11706 0.32003 0.37583 0.10478 0.15929 0.17659 
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11.8 Malmquist CRS 05-06 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 0.99860 1.16042 1.00000 0.92766 0.92766 
2 1.00000 1.00000 1.08086 0.97495 1.00000 1.05292 1.05292 
3 0.70145 0.80672 0.75179 0.75485 0.86951 1.07024 0.93058 
4 0.76411 0.75182 0.74172 0.78378 1.01634 0.96495 0.98072 
5 0.86095 0.83259 0.94992 0.75555 1.03405 1.10266 1.14021 
6 0.90180 1.00000 0.88278 1.13536 0.90180 0.92855 0.83736 
7 0.66267 0.86184 0.75370 0.73987 0.76890 1.15103 0.88502 
8 0.78117 0.88443 0.86190 0.80159 0.88324 1.10335 0.97452 
9 1.00000 1.00000 1.01925 0.99341 1.00000 1.01292 1.01292 
10 1.00000 0.90478 1.02600 0.82067 1.10524 1.06356 1.17549 
11 1.00000 1.00000 1.16722 1.10275 1.00000 1.02882 1.02882 
12 0.89234 1.00000 0.94645 1.48043 0.89234 0.84643 0.75530 
13 1.00000 1.00000 1.44038 1.37313 1.00000 1.02419 1.02419 
14 0.88929 1.00000 0.95869 1.13113 0.88929 0.97625 0.86817 
15 0.92418 0.77627 0.82670 0.88095 1.19054 0.88783 1.05699 
16 1.00000 1.00000 1.01652 1.05595 1.00000 0.98115 0.98115 
17 0.72124 0.75353 0.79578 0.68857 0.95716 1.09883 1.05175 
18 0.78786 0.75268 0.77476 0.76249 1.04674 0.98525 1.03130 
19 0.79957 0.86883 0.83045 0.84938 0.92029 1.03072 0.94856 
20 0.88997 1.00000 1.40682 2.80858 0.88997 0.75022 0.66767 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.00882 0.99842 1.00000 1.00519 1.00519 
22 0.64329 0.56759 0.58913 0.60776 1.13337 0.92481 1.04815 
23 0.96564 0.90341 0.92482 0.96752 1.06889 0.94565 1.01080 
24 1.00000 1.00000 1.18480 0.97615 1.00000 1.10171 1.10171 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.08441 1.41744 1.00000 0.87467 0.87467 
26 0.85818 0.94517 0.84164 0.86246 0.90796 1.03672 0.94130 
27 0.83323 1.00000 0.92761 0.86754 0.83323 1.13281 0.94389 
28 0.88048 1.00000 0.95616 0.94327 0.88048 1.07297 0.94472 
29 0.79562 0.91332 0.77890 1.07716 0.87112 0.91109 0.79367 
30 1.00000 1.00000 1.16938 1.02981 1.00000 1.06561 1.06561 
31 1.00000 1.00000 2.28455 1.42343 1.00000 1.26687 1.26687 
32 0.86706 1.00000 0.92453 1.13711 0.86706 0.96835 0.83962 
33 0.88475 0.89193 1.04791 0.75100 0.99196 1.18603 1.17649 
34 0.86246 0.89084 0.84952 0.94907 0.96813 0.96155 0.93090 
35 0.80809 0.85586 0.85364 0.79805 0.94419 1.06437 1.00497 
36 0.79438 0.97602 0.71391 0.97335 0.81389 0.94930 0.77263 
37 0.83931 0.81218 0.83561 0.79974 1.03340 1.00553 1.03911 
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38 1.00000 1.00000 1.46071 1.02769 1.00000 1.19220 1.19220 
39 0.72418 0.80888 0.79902 0.73312 0.89529 1.10335 0.98781 
40 1.00000 1.00000 1.03678 1.07393 1.00000 0.98255 0.98255 
41 0.94031 0.86151 0.86210 0.93893 1.09147 0.91719 1.00108 
42 0.53631 1.00000 0.52057 0.99792 0.53631 0.98624 0.52893 
43 0.84104 1.00000 0.99697 0.85055 0.84104 1.18055 0.99289 
44 0.98536 1.00000 0.92156 1.61455 0.98536 0.76110 0.74995 
45 1.00000 1.00000 0.98990 1.89295 1.00000 0.72315 0.72315 
46 0.81975 0.81008 0.84457 0.78871 1.01194 1.02869 1.04097 
47 1.00000 0.55251 0.98904 0.42925 1.80992 1.12830 2.04213 
48 0.98378 0.58432 0.95883 0.60107 1.68361 0.97339 1.63881 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.14213 1.05511 1.00000 1.04042 1.04042 
50 0.87008 0.99916 0.98451 0.91541 0.87082 1.11132 0.96776 
51 0.81266 0.88816 0.80966 0.96934 0.91499 0.95544 0.87422 
52 0.83332 1.00000 0.81126 1.05453 0.83332 0.96083 0.80068 
53 0.82838 0.78644 0.78992 0.75300 1.05333 0.99796 1.05118 
54 1.00000 1.00000 0.98175 1.07963 1.00000 0.95359 0.95359 
55 1.00000 1.00000 1.08122 1.01260 1.00000 1.03333 1.03333 
56 0.56322 0.69277 0.53763 0.80181 0.81299 0.90816 0.73833 
57 1.00000 0.97544 1.09346 0.95155 1.02518 1.05873 1.08539 
58 0.74185 0.89782 0.78965 0.81161 0.82628 1.08512 0.89662 
59 0.93097 0.90607 0.89715 1.00527 1.02749 0.93197 0.95759 
60 1.00000 1.00000 1.15906 1.03539 1.00000 1.05804 1.05804 
61 1.00000 0.95509 0.94121 1.01014 1.04702 0.94335 0.98771 
62 0.94632 0.87541 0.88434 1.08826 1.08099 0.86703 0.93725 
63 0.85270 1.00000 0.87334 2.06603 0.85270 0.70408 0.60038 
64 0.80577 0.97862 0.92186 0.86507 0.82337 1.13766 0.93671 
65 1.00000 1.00000 2.96241 0.97276 1.00000 1.74509 1.74509 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 23 31           
% 35.4% 47.7%           
Mean 0.88654 0.91572 0.98840 1.01584 0.98004 1.01430 0.99441 
Std. Dev. 0.11706 0.11444 0.34853 0.35462 0.17122 0.14373 0.22863 
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11.9 Malmquist CRS 06-07 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 1.02416 1.03646 1.00000 0.99405 1.06151 
2 1.00000 1.00000 1.09346 1.12648 1.00000 0.98523 1.23176 
3 0.80672 0.88295 0.87408 0.81460 0.91366 1.08370 0.71202 
4 0.75182 0.82145 0.80825 0.75810 0.91523 1.07930 0.61274 
5 0.83259 0.99751 0.96564 0.85481 0.83467 1.16337 0.82544 
6 1.00000 0.90849 1.21745 0.95480 1.10073 1.07629 1.16243 
7 0.86184 0.84469 0.87189 0.82636 1.02030 1.01691 0.72050 
8 0.88443 0.98956 1.00878 0.87963 0.89376 1.13276 0.88735 
9 1.00000 1.00000 1.22773 0.95675 1.00000 1.13280 1.17463 
10 0.90478 0.87529 0.87255 0.89291 1.03369 0.97229 0.77911 
11 1.00000 0.87394 1.18361 0.82110 1.14425 1.12240 0.97186 
12 1.00000 0.90376 1.21299 0.84556 1.10649 1.13863 1.02566 
13 1.00000 1.00000 1.42604 0.94899 1.00000 1.22585 1.35329 
14 1.00000 0.68083 1.44507 0.63497 1.46879 1.24476 0.91758 
15 0.77627 0.87225 0.85488 0.84681 0.88996 1.06506 0.72393 
16 1.00000 0.69627 1.14806 0.65960 1.43623 1.10086 0.75725 
17 0.75353 0.91608 0.85001 0.79475 0.82256 1.14029 0.67555 
18 0.75268 0.79773 0.80329 0.73979 0.94352 1.07277 0.59427 
19 0.86883 0.80665 0.87643 0.80107 1.07708 1.00786 0.70208 
20 1.00000 1.00000 0.96910 1.38793 1.00000 0.83560 1.34505 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.12154 1.89498 1.00000 0.76932 2.12530 
22 0.56759 0.60443 0.58560 0.55533 0.93906 1.05969 0.32520 
23 0.90341 0.87881 0.89175 0.95365 1.02799 0.95375 0.85042 
24 1.00000 1.00000 1.10767 0.92603 1.00000 1.09368 1.02574 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.23735 0.97240 1.00000 1.12804 1.20319 
26 0.94517 0.91616 0.90715 0.95449 1.03166 0.95981 0.86587 
27 1.00000 1.00000 1.22356 0.93655 1.00000 1.14300 1.14592 
28 1.00000 1.00000 0.95549 1.11700 1.00000 0.92489 1.06728 
29 0.91332 0.81938 0.83779 0.88952 1.11465 0.91922 0.74523 
30 1.00000 1.00000 1.08307 1.08339 1.00000 0.99985 1.17339 
31 1.00000 0.78949 1.64317 0.78868 1.26664 1.28252 1.29595 
32 1.00000 1.00000 1.06706 1.07364 1.00000 0.99693 1.14564 
33 0.89193 0.93027 0.91763 0.89762 0.95878 1.03259 0.82368 
34 0.89084 0.97756 0.94757 0.90397 0.91129 1.07251 0.85658 
35 0.85586 0.81612 0.86717 0.83363 1.04870 0.99595 0.72290 
36 0.97602 0.78748 1.02947 0.76370 1.23942 1.04289 0.78621 
37 0.81218 0.67909 0.80058 0.64284 1.19599 1.02044 0.51464 
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38 1.00000 1.00000 1.26774 1.42853 1.00000 0.94204 1.81101 
39 0.80888 0.91566 0.91264 0.81032 0.88339 1.12913 0.73953 
40 1.00000 1.00000 1.00083 1.15393 1.00000 0.93130 1.15489 
41 0.86151 0.87421 0.91322 0.81712 0.98547 1.06493 0.74621 
42 1.00000 0.64319 1.12999 0.59636 1.55474 1.10396 0.67388 
43 1.00000 0.98627 0.96981 1.01042 1.01392 0.97295 0.97991 
44 1.00000 1.00000 1.23517 0.94854 1.00000 1.14113 1.17161 
45 1.00000 1.00000 1.96198 0.96091 1.00000 1.42891 1.88529 
46 0.81008 0.90059 0.87047 0.79924 0.89950 1.10037 0.69571 
47 0.55251 0.60936 0.51678 0.60697 0.90670 0.96903 0.31367 
48 0.58432 0.58172 0.59243 0.57875 1.00448 1.00950 0.34287 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.26176 1.09434 1.00000 1.07377 1.38080 
50 0.99916 1.00000 0.98514 1.11905 0.99916 0.93866 1.10241 
51 0.88816 0.76926 0.81203 0.75458 1.15458 0.96543 0.61275 
52 1.00000 1.00000 0.99876 1.03582 1.00000 0.98195 1.03453 
53 0.78644 0.86341 0.85388 0.78560 0.91085 1.09238 0.67081 
54 1.00000 1.00000 1.60497 0.94572 1.00000 1.30273 1.51784 
55 1.00000 0.97895 1.09016 0.98370 1.02150 1.04159 1.07239 
56 0.69277 0.76650 0.74994 0.70742 0.90381 1.08302 0.53052 
57 0.97544 0.80319 0.98551 0.79735 1.21446 1.00882 0.78579 
58 0.89782 0.89344 0.87956 0.94135 1.00490 0.96427 0.82797 
59 0.90607 0.91899 0.93466 0.90589 0.98593 1.02297 0.84669 
60 1.00000 0.88631 0.94320 0.93567 1.12827 0.94522 0.88253 
61 0.95509 1.00000 1.14249 0.90351 0.95509 1.15064 1.03224 
62 0.87541 0.88118 0.87825 0.82854 0.99345 1.03295 0.72767 
63 1.00000 0.87987 1.25357 0.82008 1.13653 1.15973 1.02803 
64 0.97862 1.00000 0.91186 1.17109 0.97862 0.89199 1.06787 
65 1.00000 1.00000 1.11430 1.17391 1.00000 0.97428 1.30809 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 31 23           
% 47.7% 35.4%           
Mean 0.91572 0.89567 1.02659 0.91359 1.03031 1.05245 0.95155 
Std. Dev. 0.11444 0.11609 0.24304 0.21241 0.13483 0.10922 0.34188 
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11.10 Malmquist CRS 07-08 Results 
DMU # A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
1 1.00000 1.00000 1.01796 1.22029 1.00000 0.91334 0.91334 
2 1.00000 1.00000 1.01374 1.03026 1.00000 0.99195 0.99195 
3 0.88295 1.00000 0.79797 1.15555 0.88295 0.88436 0.78085 
4 0.82145 0.82062 0.75905 0.76148 1.00102 0.99790 0.99891 
5 0.99751 0.80592 0.87018 0.88215 1.23772 0.89274 1.10496 
6 0.90849 0.79689 0.91057 0.82121 1.14005 0.98621 1.12432 
7 0.84469 0.84190 0.78875 0.96903 1.00332 0.90070 0.90369 
8 0.98956 0.91983 0.88765 0.91678 1.07581 0.94868 1.02060 
9 1.00000 0.79638 1.04592 0.84747 1.25569 0.99139 1.24488 
10 0.87529 0.87400 0.91467 0.97393 1.00148 0.96839 0.96982 
11 0.87394 0.78805 0.89302 0.80027 1.10899 1.00311 1.11244 
12 0.90376 1.00000 0.92281 1.10328 0.90376 0.96203 0.86944 
13 1.00000 1.00000 1.05342 1.19828 1.00000 0.93761 0.93761 
14 0.68083 0.99914 0.80251 0.84105 0.68142 1.18333 0.80635 
15 0.87225 1.00000 0.95242 0.89751 0.87225 1.10300 0.96209 
16 0.69627 0.57553 0.66134 0.65425 1.20978 0.91408 1.10584 
17 0.91608 0.98173 0.78243 0.97932 0.93312 0.92531 0.86343 
18 0.79773 0.71329 0.71709 0.83381 1.11839 0.87691 0.98073 
19 0.80665 0.71577 0.82277 0.81521 1.12697 0.94634 1.06650 
20 1.00000 0.79001 1.21989 0.77648 1.26581 1.11406 1.41019 
21 1.00000 1.00000 1.83211 1.19357 1.00000 1.23894 1.23894 
22 0.60443 1.00000 0.56181 1.05825 0.60443 0.93719 0.56646 
23 0.87881 0.77067 0.88375 0.67969 1.14032 1.06781 1.21765 
24 1.00000 0.98615 0.93675 0.91331 1.01404 1.00571 1.01983 
25 1.00000 1.00000 1.13921 1.31603 1.00000 0.93040 0.93040 
26 0.91616 1.00000 0.95966 0.97997 0.91616 1.03387 0.94719 
27 1.00000 1.00000 1.01375 1.04148 1.00000 0.98660 0.98660 
28 1.00000 1.00000 1.13527 0.96237 1.00000 1.08613 1.08613 
29 0.81938 1.00000 0.94966 0.86112 0.81938 1.16013 0.95059 
30 1.00000 0.89854 1.11240 0.91481 1.11291 1.04529 1.16331 
31 0.78949 - - - - - - 
32 1.00000 0.98113 1.04039 0.96134 1.01923 1.03044 1.05025 
33 0.93027 0.90005 0.87190 0.96080 1.03358 0.93702 0.96848 
34 0.97756 1.00000 0.96908 1.03256 0.97756 0.97983 0.95784 
35 0.81612 0.81449 0.84288 0.81886 1.00200 1.01355 1.01557 
36 0.78748 0.75359 0.77096 0.76337 1.04497 0.98309 1.02731 
37 0.67909 1.00000 0.72809 1.09583 0.67909 0.98914 0.67171 
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38 1.00000 0.82704 1.15089 0.92730 1.20912 1.01315 1.22502 
39 0.91566 1.00000 0.81771 0.98989 0.91566 0.94982 0.86971 
40 1.00000 0.72510 1.16246 0.76515 1.37912 1.04958 1.44749 
41 0.87421 0.56709 0.86273 0.59354 1.54158 0.97103 1.49691 
42 0.64319 0.97480 0.63357 0.99582 0.65982 0.98195 0.64792 
43 0.98627 1.00000 0.95056 0.87634 0.98627 1.04871 1.03431 
44 1.00000 1.00000 1.11869 1.14601 1.00000 0.98801 0.98801 
45 1.00000 0.84127 0.98102 0.86093 1.18868 0.97909 1.16382 
46 0.90059 0.63791 0.87585 0.54016 1.41178 1.07170 1.51300 
47 0.60936 0.79073 0.76741 0.68256 0.77064 1.20786 0.93082 
48 0.58172 1.00000 0.67365 1.12248 0.58172 1.01571 0.59086 
49 1.00000 1.00000 1.05977 1.36834 1.00000 0.88005 0.88005 
50 1.00000 0.79257 1.06393 0.76748 1.26172 1.04819 1.32252 
51 0.76926 1.00000 0.83178 0.96504 0.76926 1.05851 0.81427 
52 1.00000 0.86256 1.04116 0.89468 1.15934 1.00189 1.16153 
53 0.86341 1.00000 0.74619 1.17532 0.86341 0.85750 0.74038 
54 1.00000 0.97598 0.88889 1.04426 1.02461 0.91146 0.93389 
55 0.97895 0.65335 1.02029 0.70764 1.49835 0.98095 1.46981 
56 0.76650 1.00000 0.72832 0.96331 0.76650 0.99317 0.76126 
57 0.80319 1.00000 0.81893 1.04026 0.80319 0.99002 0.79517 
58 0.89344 0.81348 0.85558 0.90803 1.09829 0.92624 1.01728 
59 0.91899 0.94355 0.96261 0.90876 0.97397 1.04287 1.01572 
60 0.88631 0.84793 0.81156 0.92165 1.04527 0.91783 0.95938 
61 1.00000 1.00000 0.90555 1.15732 1.00000 0.88456 0.88456 
62 0.88118 0.86834 0.94924 0.83689 1.01478 1.05722 1.07285 
63 0.87987 0.92332 0.84050 0.92487 0.95295 0.97655 0.93060 
64 1.00000 0.99329 1.05993 0.98039 1.00676 1.03628 1.04328 
65 1.00000 1.00000 1.61790 0.93283 1.00000 1.31697 1.31697 
Summary A B 
Model A 
Frontier B 
Model B 
Frontier A 
Δ Technical 
efficiency 
Frontier 
shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
# 
Efficient 23 26           
% 35.4% 40.6%           
Mean 0.89567 0.89941 0.93404 0.93794 1.01664 1.00037 1.01553 
Std. Dev. 0.11609 0.12045 0.20128 0.16519 0.19217 0.08839 0.20566 
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11.11 Interview 
Conference Call  
Date: 2/1/11 
Time: 12:00pm-1:00pm 
Present at Conference Call: Cristina Fouraux, Juan Rodriguez, and Interviewee 
A. Introduction 
1. We introduced ourselves  
2. The interviewee was very fascinated with our research because they have not seen 
any research similar to ours previously conducted 
3. They asked about our research in Canada and Taiwan, wondering how long the 
studies took place after their respective reforms and the period of study they used 
B. Questions 
1. We know that you were not present for the implementation of the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) in Taiwan in 1995, but do you recall what health care was like 
before you left? Do you remember what it was like going to the doctor’s? Was it 
any different than in the U.S? 
i. They left Taiwan in either 1987 or 1988 
ii. There was not a lot of insurance product in Taiwan at the time 
iii. Many people did have health insurance at the time and did not care for it 
iv. Pay as you go policy 
v. They can remember going to the doctors and their parents would pay out 
of pocket 
vi. There was not much of a wait time to see physicians or primary care 
physicians 
vii. There was a bit more of a wait to see a specialist 
viii. People of modest income level had a hard time affording health care 
ix. From what they know, people seem to really like the new health care 
product 
x. All of their family in Taiwan is very pleased with the NHI 
xi. For people in general there are not to many cases of specialized  treatment 
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2. The goals of Massachusetts health care reform, implemented in 2006, were to 
provide quality, accountable, and affordable healthcare to people in 
Massachusetts.  Do you think it succeeded in what it set out to achieve? Do you 
think it had other goals that weren’t mentioned explicitly in the act?  
i. They think all the goals of the reform have yet to be achieved 
ii. In some ways we have worked backwards 
iii. The primary goal of covering everyone still continues 
iv. They thinks that so far the government has done a good job and will 
continue to do a good job 
v. They are very impressed with administration 
vi. They believe something else will have to suffer in order for us to continue  
vii. They believe that the reform accomplished it goal of covering more 
people, but not with quality, accountability and affordability 
viii. Quality is a very complex issue that means something different to 
everyone 
ix. The coverage is not yet completely affordable for everyone 
x. Payments to providers have suffered 
xi. Providers are being forced to look at what they can do to bring down costs 
xii. Providers are becoming more competitive 
xiii. They believe that within the next two or three years we can succeed with 
our goal 
xiv. They believe Massachusetts goals are becoming the overall goal of the 
nation in regards to health care 
 
3. In our preliminary analysis and descriptive statistics (shown below), we have 
noticed a general increase in both resources (beds, registered nurses, and other 
employees not on the clinical level) and output (inpatient days, outpatient visits).  
What factor(s) do you think could have played a role in this change? 
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i. Seems like increase in capacity. Increase in capacity will also increase 
utilization and output.  
ii. Reform put pressure on hospitals 
iii. Increase in output could be due to increase in health payers 
iv. To compete with other health systems you have to begin to build capacity 
v. You have to know where your patients are coming from 
vi. Capacity expansion was on the outpatient side 
vii. Expansion is not necessarily a positive for most hospitals because of 
increase in Medicaid product 
viii. It would be foolish to say healthcare reform had not had an impact on 
utilization 
ix. They mentioned for us to look into the mass connector enrollment data 
which published the percentage of coverage by insurance plans in 
Massachusetts 
 
4. What does efficiency mean to you? Can you describe it or give a definition? 
i. Providing same quality of care at a lower cost  
ii. At minimum providing care at a lower cost 
 
5. Do you think the Massachusetts health care reform has had an impact on hospital 
efficiency in Massachusetts? 
i. Foolish to say health care reform did not have an impact on utilization 
ii. The question is just how much did utilization change due to reform? 
iii. Expansion in coverage not necessarily positive for hospitals 
a. Increase in Medicaid product negative for hospitals 
b. Paid product is good for hospitals 
iv. Also need to take pressure from economy into perspective  
 
6. Have you noticed any changes in your profession post-reform? 
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i. For  a couple of year things were looking good, but now it’s back to the old 
days 
ii. There is a lot of pressure from the state of our economy 
iii. Citizens can’t pay for premium increase year after year and this is where 
most of the pressure comes from for reform 
iv. The medical profession is fairly resistant to change and it is very 
individualistic (They value individual judgment) 
 
 
 
 
 
